

ASRS Database Report Set

Air Carrier (FAR 121) Flight Crew Fatigue Reports

Report Set Description	A sampling of reports referencing air carrier (FAR 121) flight crew fatigue issues and duty periods.
Update Number	18
Date of Update.....	July 27, 2012
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set.....	39
Type of Records in Report Set	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000



TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell

Linda J. Connell, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that *at least* 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS data is the **qualitative information** contained in **report narratives**. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 1002798 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

A reserve First Officer reported that after landing at either 0500 or 0700, reserve pilots are expected to be phone ready for next day assignments during that day, which does not allow for adequate rest. The reporter called in fatigued for an trip and was docked pay.

ACN: 1002406 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

An international Captain reported extreme fatigue experienced by him and his First Officer on a non-augmented Far East leg following a Pacific crossing.

ACN: 1000520 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757 crew described a 100 KTS rejected takeoff because of an EICAS YAW DAMPER alert. The crew arrived on late night flight and were departing prior to sunrise so fatigue was felt.

ACN: 998491 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

EMB145 First Officer describes a four day paring greatly altered by maintenance and weather delays, that results in a fatigue call to Scheduling on the final day.

ACN: 997790 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

A319 Captain is scheduled to ferry an aircraft at 0800 and plans rest accordingly. The aircraft is not completed on schedule and the Captain is required to keep checking on updates during the day. The crew is finally sent to the airport at 2200 and does not depart until after 0100. Fatigue is reported.

ACN: 997228 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

An A320 First Officer reported that he and the Captain removed themselves from a trip fatigued because the four day trip upset their circadian rhythm and they were making too many errors.

ACN: 995231 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

A fatigued Captain nearly landed on the EWR 22R runway edge lights which he mistook for centerline lights but became reoriented by the First Officer's "Centerline" alert. Fatigue and crew rest were major factors.

ACN: 994968 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 Captain describes a fatiguing training/line check scenario beginning with a long drive for an early check in to deadhead to SXM. Training/checking occurs on the return leg ending with a low fuel declaration and landing in a down pour.

ACN: 994901 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

An Air Carrier Captain complained that MIA TRACON set his aircraft up for a night visual approach and almost insisted that they accept a visual approach when his preference, after an all night flight, was to fly a published approach.

ACN: 993033 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

A Reserve First Officer was awakened after three hours of sleep by Crew Scheduling to be assigned a trip 14 hours in the future. The trip is declined due to fatigue.

ACN: 992828 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737-300 flight crew encountered some confusion and distraction when an engine experienced compressor stalls right at rotation at night. Well intentioned but flawed observations from the Tower Controller contributed to the complexity of resolving the issues as they suggested there may have been problems with both engines.

ACN: 992718 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

An E-145 Captain refused a reassignment to additional flying following a ten day period that included only a single day off.

ACN: 990710 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

A late runway change, fatigue and an inability to fully brief their runway exit plan resulted in an Air Carrier flight crew crossing Runway 12 on T5 at MIA, vice holding short as cleared.

ACN: 990268 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

When an ERJ-170 flight crew flew runway heading, 098 degrees, vice the BOI 098R per the SID, a strong south wind drifted them toward high terrain. An alert Air Traffic Controller questioned their track and then vectored them clear of the terrain.

ACN: 989497 (15 of 50)

Synopsis

An fatigued ERJ190 Captain failed to set the parking brake after gate arrival and consequently the aircraft rolled forward until the First Officer stopped it after sensing movement.

ACN: 988734 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

B757 Captain describes his inability to stay awake during a red eye flight and offers suggestions.

ACN: 988345 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

A fatigued CRJ200 Captain noticed the FMS CHK POSITION alert on after takeoff but failed to take action or notify the First Officer until well into the flight when the GPS position was used to update the FMS.

ACN: 988191 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 pilot reports descending early on an ILS approach in VMC possibly due to fatigue after a very challenging day of flying.

ACN: 987613 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ200 First Officer describes a long duty day of IMC flying that culminates in a missed approach at DCA. With no real prospect of weather improvement at DCA the crew elects to divert. The Dispatcher strongly suggests that the crew hold until minimum fuel or attempt another approach. The crew declines.

ACN: 985835 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ200 Captain, on a downwind vector for Runway 23 at CRW and descending to 3,100 FT, experiences a terrain warning and climbs to 3,700 FT. ATC advises that the MVA is 3,100 FT and continues vectors for the approach.

ACN: 984126 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

A CRJ flight crew experienced apparent engine vibration just prior to descent for landing. They declared an emergency and landed without incident.

Factors contributing to the flight crew's ordeal included: fatigue, multiple legs; and multiple aircraft swaps each with deferred maintenance items.

ACN: 984026 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737-300 Captain reported difficulty complying with the GEELA 4 RNAV arrival to PHX due primarily to numerous airspeed assignments and revised altitude clearances. On final approach it was discovered that the Captain's altimeter was not set to local and the descent and approach checklists had not been accomplished.

ACN: 983158 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

A CRJ-200 flight crew experienced a momentary deviation from their cleared GS intercept altitude when the autopilot intercepted a false glide slope and climbed in response. Distractions and possible fatigue were cited as factors in the Captain's delayed response and return to their clearance.

ACN: 983056 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

A low time in type B757 flight crew failed to cross an intersection at the prescribed altitude when flying a charted RNAV Visual approach to a foreign airport. Fatigue and inexperience in type were cited as contributing factors.

ACN: 982948 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain describes a track deviation that occurs after being cleared direct and entering direct in the FMC but not selecting NAV on the MCP. Fatigue is reported to be a significant factor.

ACN: 982491 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

A Regional Jet First Officer reported not arming the approach during a visual approach to Runway 10 at ATL resulting in an overshoot and a TCAS TA. The Captain detected the deviation and took control to return to the localizer. Fatigue was cited as a contributing factor.

ACN: 981813 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

An international two person flight crew became fatigued on a westbound trans-Atlantic flight and diverted to BOS for rest.

ACN: 981506 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737-800 Captain reported fatigue during a return flight from a foreign destination following a divert for weather, fog, clearance difficulties and weight and balance issues.

ACN: 981257 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

A B747-400 engine flamed out at FL340 during oceanic cruise. Crew was unable to restart it. An emergency was declared, the track offset, a descent to FL300 completed and the flight diverted to a domestic airport.

ACN: 981249 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

Fatigue was cited as a factor when an A319 missed a crossing restriction.

ACN: 980529 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

An air carrier Captain described fatigue after his reserve trip departure time was reset from an early afternoon departure to a late night departure after poor sleep planned for the earlier flight.

ACN: 980396 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

A DHC8 Captain canceled IFR on a night approach to a CTAF airport and subsequently the aircraft momentarily entered IMC conditions. Situational awareness, fatigue and CRM were components in this error.

ACN: 980270 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

A B767 Captain reported the flight attendant crew on the inbound aircraft turned around on his outbound flight but because of a previous maintenance delay would be on duty for 17.5 hours at the destination and were so fatigued they were unsafe.

ACN: 980205 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

A B717 First Officer reported climbing through the assigned flight level by engaging the vertical speed mode of the autopilot and disabling the altitude hold function. Fatigue was cited as a contributing factor.

ACN: 979001 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain describes the rigors of flying a red eye from west to east with only two pilots and believes that crew based in the east would be better suited to this flying.

ACN: 978769 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

A breakdown in communications with the Tower contributed to a near runway incursion after landing by an air carrier flight crew in STL.

ACN: 978642 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

After flying in excess of eight hours the day prior, an A320 First Officer was ordered by his airline to fly an international trip the next day without the minimum intervening rest break required by FAR.

ACN: 978161 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

An Air Carrier Captain on day six of an eight day trip failed to follow the prescribed VTBS (BKK) taxi route from the departure gate, an error mostly the result of fatigue. On takeoff the aircraft may have hit a very large bird.

ACN: 978125 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

A conflict arose between the Captain of a CRJ-200 and her Chief Pilot over the propriety of dispatching a flight with the autopilot deferred inoperative; the Captain believing it would be too fatiguing and the Chief Pilot asserting the flight was appropriate because the MEL did not require the autopilot to be operative. The Captain refused the aircraft and was removed from flight status pending resolution of their differences.

ACN: 978064 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

B767 flight crew holding short for Runway 8R (HS5) is cleared for takeoff but the Captain turns left for Runway 12 while the First Officer is completing the takeoff

checklist. Flight is cleared for takeoff Runway 12. Fatigue is cited as a contributing factor by the Captain.

ACN: 977672 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

A CRJ-900 Captain reported deviating from the charted course on departure from DCA, citing failure to brief and properly set up navigation systems as contributory factors. Fatigue was also a factor.

ACN: 977514 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737-700 Captain reported getting a low altitude alert from MDW Tower following an unstable approach. Reporter mentioned fatigue as a factor.

ACN: 977153 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

Following four Continuous Duty Overnights (CDOs), a DHC-8 flight crew performed an emergency descent due to the failure of the cabin to pressurize. Once stable at a safe altitude they discovered the engine bleeds had never been opened despite the requirement that they be checked open during the performance of both the Before Takeoff and Climb checklists. The reporter stressed his belief that accumulated fatigue from the ragged rest schedule was a major contributor to the oversight.

ACN: 976953 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

A tired B767-300ER flight crew suffered a momentary altitude excursion before they could get a clarification to a confusing clearance.

ACN: 976585 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

An MD80 Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on approach to TUS. Failure to recognize LOC did not capture and fatigue played a part.

ACN: 976284 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

A CRJ200 First Officer experienced confusion while attempting to reprogram the FMC to reflect a runway change. The downwind leg of the arrival remains on the south side of the airport which does not appear correct to the reporter and delays execution of the changes, resulting in a minor track deviation. Fatigue was cited as a factor in the incident.

ACN: 976210 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757 flight crew refused an aircraft because of an oil leak and when the subsequent departure delay created a very long duty day they called in fatigued and were replaced.

ACN: 976206 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

A B767 executed a go-around after receiving a GPWS "TOO LOW TERRAIN" alert because a foreign ATC Controller issued a QFE altimeter lower than the ATIS QNH setting which was actually correct.

ACN: 974547 (49 of 50)

Synopsis

After an arrival fix crossing altitude was changed to "at or below FL240", both pilots verified the B737-700 MCP and FMC entries but somehow the FMC transitioned to Vertical Speed without the pilots seeing, and the crossing restriction was missed.

ACN: 974204 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 Captain reports calling in fatigued when poor preflight rest and maintenance delays combine to produce unacceptable fatigue.

Report Narratives

Time / Day

Date : 201203
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : No Aircraft
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Passenger

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1002798
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General : Work Refused

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Continuously, we fly all nighters back from West to East. We land at either 0500 or 0700. We are expected to be phone available even in "crew rest." It is impossible to sleep in the morning while being expected to keep the telephone on. We are

continuously interrupted by outside contacts but are not allowed to turn off our phone. Almost every time on reserve, the pilots are assigned a 0200 or 0300 short call assignment for that same night. It is physically impossible to be interrupted from phone availability requirements, get more than 4 hours of sleep that same night, and be fit to fly when called at 0200. We are fatigued every time in these circumstances. We have been advised to "accept the assignment" but if we are called and unfit, then to say we are "fatigued." In these circumstances, we are questioned by the Flight Office when this is a complete and egregious safety issue we are continuously expected to comply with "as per the contract." I was so fatigued upon a 0300 call from the crew desk after flying an all-nighter, I did not hear my phone until 4:27 and four calls later. Now I am punished with 5 hours of pay docked and a missed flight for what is an unsafe practice for back to back and multiple swing shifts in just a 72 hour period.

Synopsis

A reserve First Officer reported that after landing at either 0500 or 0700, reserve pilots are expected to be phone ready for next day assignments during that day, which does not allow for adequate rest. The reporter called in fatigued for an trip and was docked pay.

Time / Day

Date : 201203

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport

State Reference : FO

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft

Reference : X

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 20000

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 240

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 4500

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1002406

Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing

Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

[This flight assignment] is unsafe as constructed. This leg requires augmentation. The extent of physical impairment was so severe that it put us at risk. We violated every facet of the CRM/TEM concept. During this leg the First Officer and I were in and out of microsleep. I would startle myself awake only to find my First Officer slumped over the controls. This is unacceptable. When the human physiology of sleep is denied, as in circadian disruptions, then there is absolutely nothing you can do short of taking drugs to stay awake. This is NOT just an all nighter. This is back side of the clock on the other side of the world. Circadian low point occurs 2 hours into the flight. And the flight starts off with sleep debt due to the all nighter to [a Far East Pacific crossing destination] followed by this leg to [another Far East destination about 6 hours away]. At the end of the flight we have been up for 24 hours.

After we arrive in ZZZ and get to bed we wake up at 0200 local. This is the middle of our body clock day. The so-called nap before pickup is just staring at the walls since we are in our daytime body clock. By the time we launch we are now in circadian low, 0100-0400 body time. The sleep debt coming over also begins to rear its ugly head. We were just trying to survive the flight. Words cannot describe the physical toll this took on us and the effort needed to stay alert enough to get on the ground safely. We were shaking ourselves, reading checklists over and over trying to stay awake for the arrival. Worse were the lingering effects over the next couple of days. This doesn't just go away. The cumulative sleep debt and the reaction of the body to forcing it into sleep deprivation during this time have a long term recovery. You don't just go to bed and all is well. It takes several days to recover. This is borderline reckless to deliberately put ourselves in this physical state and then fly. Augment or change the departure times.

Synopsis

An international Captain reported extreme fatigue experienced by him and his First Officer on a non-augmented Far East leg following a Pacific crossing.

Time / Day

Date : 201203
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Takeoff

Component

Aircraft Component : Autoflight Yaw Damper
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 21000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1000520
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Time Pressure

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 1500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 220
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 6000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 100535
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

All operations from check-in to line-up and wait were normal and went well. After clearance to take off I released brakes, stabilized throttles and advanced for take-off, pushed EPR. It was still dark. I saw an EICAS message for YAW DAMPER and commenced abort procedures. Started with autothrottles OFF and was beginning to retard the throttles when I heard the First Officer make the 80 KTS call and what sounded like "continue." I had already started moving the throttles toward idle and rejected the take off. The First Officer said he was not surprised as he saw my hand moving - I did not call aborting takeoff or reject. I directed the First Officer to notify Tower, with no assistance required. I had disengaged the RTO as we were very light with more than adequate runway remaining. I allowed the aircraft to continue rolling and exited the runway at Y while the First Officer made the "remain seated" call.

We waited for taxi instructions (brakes were not set) and the First Officer reviewed the checklists. Weight/speed good. I thought the max speed attained was 100-110, First Officer felt 110-120 we used the higher speed. Continued to gate where airplane is chocked and brakes are released. [We] made PA for passengers. After confirming from Contract Maintenance the airplane still had to sit for one hour, [we] coordinated with station to remove passengers. Station [was] very helpful through entire situation. We both feel the outcome was successful and handled with ease. We were very light (185,000), momentary RTO and cool temperature (13C) and Maintenance Manual still showed 1 hour wait, brakes were ice cold. At the gate I talked to the flight attendants and they indicated everything was fine, no passengers were upset and they heard the "remain seated" call. Some other factors affecting our flight today was the early report time, we had already mentioned

drive times in and how much sleep we had. We both felt issues with all nighters being paired with early departures with minimum/no recovery time or minimum days off is always a factor/threat.

Narrative: 2

[Narrative 2 had no new information]

Synopsis

A B757 crew described a 100 KTS rejected takeoff because of an EICAS YAW DAMPER alert. The crew arrived on late night flight and were departing prior to sunrise so fatigue was felt.

Time / Day

Date : 201203
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Parked

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 998491
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Work Refused

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I feel like the fatigue has built over the duration of the pairing. On my first day of the pairing I reported to the airport early to tend to some other business. This put me in the airport environment about 3 hours before my show time. The previous

night I received 8 hours of quality sleep. I felt refreshed and ready to start my trip. At show time, I noticed the flight had been delayed 1-1.5 hours due to a late inbound aircraft. Subsequently, we would be late for the rest of the day. We arrived to the hotel that night at about 12:30 AM Eastern Time (EST) and I didn't fall asleep till sometime between 1:00 AM and 1:30 AM. Our show the next day was around 4:00 PM so in order to prepare for another evening of flying I allowed myself to sleep in longer than I normally would. I woke up about 9:30 AM EST on day two. I received about 8 hours of sleep, but was of poor quality. Most of the night was spent tossing and turning. Nonetheless, I felt with the later show I would be prepared to fly that evening. Two hours before our show we were notified that our flight had been canceled and they were working on modifying our schedule. After many rounds of adjustment (most being much better than the final result) we were told to stay in the hotel until the next morning were we would then fly one leg then deadhead back to base to resume our pairing. The Captain would be leaving the crew to continue on another schedule. With the new schedule we now had a 5:00 AM wake up (4:00 AM CST) to be at the airport for our show time. Since I prepared to be flying that evening I was now wide awake until almost 12:00 AM. I received 5 hours of what felt like ok sleep. The next day we realized our deadhead was not going to put us back in base in time to resume our pairing. We accepted the fact that the day was ultimately going to be behind the entire day. We were originally scheduled for a 10 hour duty day to move into a 14 hour overnight. As the day progressed we were again modified to fly a different turn out of base due to our tardiness. This turn ended up having an added 1.5 hour maintenance delay. Ultimately we were about 3 hours behind our schedule. Once we arrived at our third overnight we were 3 hours late. We arrived at the hotel at about 8:40 PM CST. I had now been awake since 4:00 AM CST on about 5 hours of sleep. Total duty day after crew scheduling modifications came to 15:10. I ate a light dinner as I had not had a chance to obtain food due to delays. I was in my hotel room by 10:00 PM CST as I prepared for bed. With the next morning being the morning for our time change to CDT it was theoretically 11:00 PM. By the time I feel asleep it was some where around 12:30 AM. Our show time was 8:05 AM CDT leaving me with about 6.5 hours of what felt like ok sleep. As I awoke this morning I notice my eyes were red and irritated and I had a minor headache. We arrived to the airport and the flight departed on time. Throughout the flight I notice my reaction time was slow, I had a hard time focusing and I felt myself wanting to fall asleep. There was quite a bit of weather to deal with that concluded with an approach to minimums. The flight completed with no incident but looking back I did not feel I would have been able to perform at my highest level should a major event have occurred. This is when I decide to remove myself from the remainder of my trip. I notified Crew Scheduling as soon as we deplaned.

Obviously the circumstances that caused the cancellations and modifications are never predictable or avoidable. However, I do feel the tactic of just scheduling something just get to the next segment with no regard to crew rest or movement greatly reduces the ability of the crew to mitigate fatigue. Many of the modifications that Crew Scheduling provided before the final result would have left me in a much better position to be well rested and ready for what a day of bad weather flying usually brings. I felt like I did my best in trying to prepare for the pairing that was presented to me.

Synopsis

EMB145 First Officer describes a four day pairing greatly altered by maintenance and weather delays, that results in a fatigue call to Scheduling on the final day.

Time / Day

Date : 201203
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A319
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Parked

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 997790
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

We ferried an aircraft to a Maintenance Base where Maintenance was to replace the windshield overnight and at 0800 local, we were scheduled to fly the fixed airplane back. I got up at 0530 and started getting ready. Thinking the Maintenance may not be finished I contacted Scheduling. They did say the job was not completed and there was going to be an update at 0800. I called back at 0800 and was told there was now an update at 1000. I called Scheduling several times all day getting the same answer, airplane not finished. During one of my phone calls in the late afternoon, I asked Scheduling if the fixing of the airplane goes well into the night and morning, when do I get my rest? They said I have been on rest all day and do not require rest. I told them I am not getting rest as I am being told to check back with them on one or two hour increments to check the status of the airplane. They then reiterated I was indeed on legal FAA rest. After that conversation, time drove on and I did get the phone call at 2216 that the plane is ready and departure time was to be 2300. The First Officer and I went to the airport and got to the gate at 2310. The airplane was not ready. We stood on the jetway until Maintenance finished and pushed after 0100. At that point I had been awake for almost 20 hours. During the flight I realized I was indeed over tired and should have called in fatigued.

Synopsis

A319 Captain is scheduled to ferry an aircraft at 0800 and plans rest accordingly. The aircraft is not completed on schedule and the Captain is required to keep checking on updates during the day. The crew is finally sent to the airport at 2200 and does not depart until after 0100. Fatigue is reported.

Time / Day

Date : 201203
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 37000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 4500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 997228
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Work Refused
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

I was on my 8th day in a row away from home; two 4-day trips back-to-back, each with 30+ hour layovers that arrived late on day 1 and departed early on day 3, which puts my body clock out of whack. Predawn hotel pickup; the Captain and I both missed the correct altimeter setting on the before start checklist and the revised route on the PDC, even though I picked up the PDC and read it, which is my standard technique. We discovered the altimeter error on taxi-out and the PDC revision on departure, when Departure cleared us to a fix that was not programmed in the FMGC. We both removed ourselves from the remainder of the trip due to fatigue.

Synopsis

An A320 First Officer reported that he and the Captain removed themselves from a trip fatigued because the four day trip upset their circadian rhythm and they were making too many errors.

Time / Day

Date : 201202
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10
Light : Night
Ceiling.Single Value : 20000
RVR.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : EWR
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Cargo / Freight
Flight Phase : Landing
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B : EWR

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 995231
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Pilot performance issue due to fatigue brought on by days on end of minimum rest. Began day in Spain a maintenance stop in Canada and then to Newark. Due to landing weight near maximum, the Captain was the flying pilot. The Crew had briefed the visual approach and side step to Runway 22R at Newark. The visual approach was entirely normal. As we neared the displaced threshold, the First Officer called "centerline". I immediately made a correction to centerline. The aircraft aligned with the runway centerline. Touch down was long at around 2,000 FT, the beginning of the declared usable runway for Runway 22R. The landing roll out was normal. Any more of a deviation would have required a go around. The illusion was the runway edge lights looked like the runway centerline lighting. Most of the time, we land on Runway 22L at Newark. Proper CRM by the First Officer alerted me to the slot alignment problem. Fatigue and crew rest were major players in this event.

Synopsis

A fatigued Captain nearly landed on the EWR 22R runway edge lights which he mistook for centerline lights but became reoriented by the First Officer's "Centerline" alert. Fatigue and crew rest were major factors.

Time / Day

Date : 201202
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC
State Reference : NY

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Descent

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 70
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 994968
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Fuel Issue
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was scheduled for a Class II line check featuring a [northeast airport] to Saint Maarten (SXM) dead head flight with an hour plus on the ground and then me flying the aircraft back as the Captain where I would also receive training and a check ride. I had an early report time, which for me is a cross town assignment making for a long drive and a very early get up to deal with traffic associated with [the area]. Looking at the trip a week or so prior to departure, I cringed at how long of a day it was going to be especially having to fly and receive training and checking after a dead head in the cabin of a full aircraft. While legal, I know of no pilot who considers dead heading in the cabin of full aircraft restful in any respect. I got to SXM already tired. I felt like I had been put in a box by scheduling and had expressed my concerns with my chief pilot about this trip a few days prior; asking him, "Why are we building training like this?" This was not an operational necessity, it was a choice made by the line check desk to have me trained under these conditions. I contemplated declaring myself fatigued in SXM but I felt tremendous pressure to fly the flight. I knew if I did not operate the flight we would have 150 stranded passengers and the flight would cancel. I also knew that I would have to deal with a ration of phone calls and perhaps even threats of discipline if I canceled the flight. I told my Check Airman that I was in dead tired and he, coming off of a 25 hour SXM layover, agreed with me; stating that this was a poor way to schedule training and that in his opinion a flying leg down with a layover and a flying leg out was the correct way for a pilot to see both the entry and exit into SXM (which can be challenging) and to receive the Class II Training. We were planned at max gross, every seat full, taking off from SXM, with a planned landing fuel of 5.9 LBS. While I was very tired, we had an uneventful flight up to the East Coast, flying the planned profile altitudes and cruise speeds. ATC had us descend nearly 200 miles from destination and with the over burn due to heavier than forecast head winds, fuel started to become an issue. New York ATC vectoring into sequence compounded the over burn issue and we declared "Minimum Fuel." We were eventually vectored onto the final just as a rain storm was rolling onto the field. We picked up heavy precipitation at approximately 500 FT AGL and with the fuel at 3.8; I thought to myself, this is going to be a very bad situation if we have to go around for wind shear now. We made an uneventful landing but I recall my heart beating in my chest rather rapidly for the last 15 minutes of the flight due to the fuel situation, weather and the countless cups of coffee I was forced to drink throughout the day to overcome the fatiguing nature of this training assignment. I recall thinking to myself while waiting in line to clear customs that this assignment had red flags all over it prior to it beginning. With 25+ years of military and civilian aviation experience, I saw the potential difficulties prior to beginning the assignment and even voiced my concerns to my chief pilot with the complaints being answered with "nothing I can really do for you, it's all legal." Every mishap happens with a chain of events that proceeds it and while this situation ended normally, I walked off that aircraft absolutely spent and had difficulty sleeping again that night thinking about the "what ifs." By the time I left the airport I had been on the property for over 13 hours, had over 8.5 hours of combined dead head and flight time and had not slept for 17+ hours. It was one of the longest and most stressful days I have had flying in a long time and again this was not part of some irregular operation; this was scheduled training. Note: The Check Airman who conducted the training was both fair and competent, and while the day was a completely negative experience by the nature of the schedule, the Check Airman did his duties in a professional manner considering the circumstances.

Synopsis

A320 Captain describes a fatiguing training/line check scenario beginning with a long drive for an early check in to deadhead to SXM. Training/checking occurs on the return leg ending with a low fuel declaration and landing in a down pour.

Time / Day

Date : 201202
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MIA.Airport
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : MIA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 3
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Route In Use : Vectors
Route In Use.STAR : FLIPPR TWO
Airspace.Class B : MIA

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3300
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 994901
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

On the FLIPR TWO arrival, crossing FLIPR at 12,000 FT MSL (landing east), we reported onto Approach Control with the ATIS information. Prior to sunrise, still night time, the sky was clear and the visibility was unrestricted. Flight was being radar vectored for an ILS approach to Runway 09. Then, we were given a descent clearance from 6,000 FT MSL to 3,000 FT MSL. Controller instructed us to turn to heading 320. Even though he didn't say it that is a direct track to GRITT, the IAF for ILS Runway 09; the event began approximately at 3,000 FT MSL when the Controller asked if we had "the field in sight." I, as the pilot flying, was "expecting" vectors for ILS 09 not a "tricky" way to drive me to a VISUAL APPROACH that I had not requested. The Controller did NOT "offer" us visual, he only asked if "we had the field in sight" after he had instructed us onto heading 300 and to descend to 1,500 FT MSL. At the beginning we said "...NEGATIVE YET..." and he re-emphasized asking again seconds later of giving us the "position of the airport" twice. The last call was "...Air Carrier 1234 heavy the airport is now three o'clock about five miles." He again and again continued leading us toward a VISUAL. After we said "YES," we were approved to something that we had not asked. I understand I shouldn't be complaining because it was finally us who accepted, but the fact is during the whole approach he was "lobbying" for the VISUAL approach. This is not the first time, nor an isolated event, where MIAMI ATC vectors an aircraft into MIA on a heading to the base leg to final approach course, at 230 KTS; it's been going on for the past 20 years. This procedure places the aircraft at the outer marker in its limits for descent and slowdown in the remaining distance to touchdown. I know it was not uncommon to "slam-dunk" that challenged the crew clearance to get stabilized in speed, before glideslope descent rate and landing, but in this opportunity, the Controller goes to a real limit. We were in a 250 KTS descend and trying to decelerating to reach the flaps speed. Using the speed brakes and landing gear we reached a stabilized approach at 1,000 FT for company policy. The visual approach and landing were uneventful. Lesson learned: until we have the "Continuous Descent Arrival (CDA)" on all airports around the world and my company sends a request to ATC "...not to 'slam-dunk' our airplanes in MIA please," we will continue testing with the "magic phrases" like "unable visual" or "going around" if we are not stabilized. Even though there were no signals of an unstabilized approach, it would have been beneficial to ask the pilot if he/she could

accept a visual approach. A long duty night with an early arrival (night) should always raise the red flags.

Synopsis

An Air Carrier Captain complained that MIA TRACON set his aircraft up for a night visual approach and almost insisted that they accept a visual approach when his preference, after an all night flight, was to fly a published approach.

Time / Day

Date : 201202

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Other
Light : Dawn
Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Passenger

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 8000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 993033
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.General : Work Refused

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

At 17:00L, contacted to report to the Airport ASAP to serve on "Field Standby" to ferry a B777. While driving to the airport, a two hour drive, I was in contact with scheduling that the auto traffic was heavy. When I arrived at flight operations, I was told the flight was canceled but never informed. I sat "field standby" until

23:30L, then went to my car and drove home. Arriving home at 03:00L, took a shower, and went to sleep at 04:00L. The crew desk woke me at 07:00L, three hours of sleep after a full day of driving (300 miles) and assigned me a flying seat assignment leaving fourteen hours later. I refused based on fatigue, they should have reviewed my schedule and called a few hours later, thereby DOUBLING my sleep. I felt too exhausted and decided it was UNSAFE to be awake all day, to again drive two hours and then occupy the flying seat to [an international destination].

Synopsis

A Reserve First Officer was awakened after three hours of sleep by Crew Scheduling to be assigned a trip 14 hours in the future. The trip is declined due to fatigue.

Time / Day

Date : 201201
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Takeoff

Component

Aircraft Component : Turbine Engine
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 992828
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Confusion

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Declared Emergency
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Flight was day two of a three-day pairing, last leg. The flight was delayed approximately one hour and 20 minutes due to an unscheduled aircraft swap. The First Officer was pilot flying. Right at rotation, the left engine compressor stalled with the associated loud bang. We initially thought it was a blown tire until the engine stalled several more times during the initial climb out. The First Officer continued to fly as we accomplished the immediate action items for the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall Checklist and the compressor stalls ceased with the throttle at mid range.

We told Tower we were an immediate return with an engine malfunction and requested an easterly heading and climb. Tower advised they saw what appeared to be fire/flame from the right engine area. However, I was convinced the #1 engine was the culprit. As the pilot not flying, I never saw an engine over temperature or rollback. The fire and overheat circuits checked good and we elected to leave the engine running in idle and make a single engine landing per the QRH.

ATC accommodated a return to Runway 25R since it was the longest runway available. Winds were out of the north at eight knots and we were fairly light. I made several PAs to the passengers about securing the engine and our intentions to return. The First Officer set up for a flaps 15 visual and made a nice approach and landing. Total airborne time was 16 minutes. After landing, I shut down the engine and had the emergency crews check for aircraft damage. No damage was discovered and we taxied to the gate where the passengers deplaned normally.

There were several lessons I learned from this event. First, it was very similar to a V1 cut during a PC, night, right at rotation, loud bang etc. However, we weren't in that PC mindset. We were relaxed, last leg, day two, comfortable flying together and definitely not expecting anything unusual. When the bang occurred right at rotation, we thought we had blown a tire. The First Officer had recently experienced a blown tire on takeoff and didn't call for the gear, which seemed like the right thing to do at the time. Once we were certain it was an engine problem, we raised the gear.

Second, Tower's radio call that they saw fire/flame from the right engine added to the initial confusion as to what had happened. When the engine banged a second and third time, I could see a glow from my left window that convinced me we at least had a #1 engine problem, but did we have a dual engine stall or possible FOD? There was a small helmet fire starting in the left seat but the First Officer was doing just what he should maintaining aircraft control. We were climbing, so we went with what we knew and took the proper action from there. We ran the checklist for the engine stall and elected to leave the engine running since it was in limits and running.

Third, the First Officer is experienced and was doing a great job so I let him fly. The FOM says the Captain will land if an engine is shut down; however, the engine was running in idle. The First Officer had everything under control, so I elected to let him continue with the approach and landing.

Fourth, communicate with the cabin. We were busy! Right after takeoff a flight attendant rang the cockpit four times wanting to know what was happening. I elected to pass information to the flight attendants and passengers via the PA to save time and brain bites. During my debrief with the flight attendants, I asked them if they felt comfortable and informed with the way I handled the situation, and they said yes. However, this is now something I include in my briefing to them, i.e. how they can expect to get information in a time crunch situation such as right after takeoff.

Finally, be ready for the unexpected. I found I probably wasn't at the top of my game after a long airport sit before the last leg of the day. It's easy to get complacent. This is the first engine problem I've had outside the simulator after 14 years on line. Analyze the situation/problem. Even though ATC may try and help too much, go with what you know after a thorough discussion with the other pilot, and then take the appropriate action.

Synopsis

A B737-300 flight crew encountered some confusion and distraction when an engine experienced compressor stalls right at rotation at night. Well intentioned but flawed observations from the Tower Controller contributed to the complexity of resolving the issues as they suggested there may have been problems with both engines.

Time / Day

Date : 201202
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Parked

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 992718
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected.Other
Result.General : Work Refused

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

[I] worked four on, one off, five on. On the fifth day--at the end of pairing--Scheduling tried to reassign me. It was already a 12 hour duty day with a three hour sit included. [I] had to fly with new First Officers which made my work load much higher. I didn't get much sleep the night before either (Day 4). Fell asleep late and woke up twice from passing noises. I was burnt out and was not going to operate any airplane when that exhausted.

Long duty day, new First Officers making work load higher, numerous MEL's on planes, not a good night's sleep all contributed to me being fatigued.

Just part of the job.

Synopsis

An E-145 Captain refused a reassignment to additional flying following a ten day period that included only a single day off.

Time / Day

Date : 201201
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MIA.Airport
State Reference : FL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : MIA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Taxi

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 990710
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 990709

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

After landing on Runway 9 in MIA, we exited onto Taxiway T5. We were directed by Tower to turn left onto Taxiway T. For some reason the entire crew, while looking ahead of the airplane, saw taxiway signage indicating that Taxiway T was ahead of us and misinterpreted ATC's instructions to turn left. Instead I taxied ahead toward the short section of Taxiway T that lay on the other side of Runway 12, which was active. Assuming we had clearance to cross Runway 12 I scanned to the left and saw a regional jet on final. It seemed like it was too close and so I advanced power so as to cross the runway as rapidly as possible. Just as we began to clear the runway Tower sent the other aircraft around and then asked us why we had not turned left as instructed.

I think it was just a lack of attention to detail, perhaps made worse by fatigue brought on by the odd operating hours of our duty period. Also, I had just taken control of the jet from the co-pilot who had done the landing and my total attention was not on ATC when the clearance was transmitted.

Narrative: 2

A last minute change from ATC opened up Runway 9 and cleared us for the visual to that runway. We didn't have much time to brief our new taxi route and then had a miscommunication with ATC on what we were cleared to do. In addition, we were just getting back from an overnight flight and our body was on the back side of the clock. The fact of being tired could have contributed to our lack of attention to detail.

Synopsis

A late runway change, fatigue and an inability to fully brief their runway exit plan resulted in an Air Carrier flight crew crossing Runway 12 on T5 at MIA, vice holding short as cleared.

Time / Day

Date : 201201
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BOI.Airport
State Reference : ID

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : BOI
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175 ER&LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class C : BOI
Maintenance Status.Released For Service : Y

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 990268
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Other / Unknown

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On departure from [Runway] 10L out of BOI airport, ATC asked us if we were flying runway heading or if we were tracking the 098 radial from BOI VOR. We then realized our mistake. We were in fact on runway heading and not tracking the 098 radial per the departure procedure. There was rising terrain to the north or left of our course and the wind was 30 KTS from the south, which was pushing us toward the terrain. We even had the terrain up on our MFD and I had made a comment about how something didn't seem right. At that point ATC gave us a right turn until we were higher than the terrain and then cleared us on course. We turned on course and at no time did we get an EGPWS warning.

This was the last leg of the day for us and it was at night during IFR conditions. We had a scheduled 12 hour day, which I believe played a big part in this event. We were tired and I have personally noticed that after 10 hours of duty my attention to detail is reduced. I think it is unrealistic to maintain the same level of competency after 10 hours of duty. Neither one of us had ever been to BOI and was unfamiliar with the airport. We read over all the info available to us including the departure procedure but we misunderstood the chart. We thought it said runway heading and not track the radial. I think having this info on the company airport page as a reminder to all of us would be very helpful. There is info on the arrival part of the page but nothing for the departure.

Synopsis

When an ERJ-170 flight crew flew runway heading, 098 degrees, vice the BOI 098R per the SID, a strong south wind drifted them toward high terrain. An alert Air Traffic Controller questioned their track and then vectored them clear of the terrain.

Time / Day

Date : 201201
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 190/195 ER&LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Taxi

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 989497
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 989498
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We arrived at our crew base after a very long four day trip. We had been on duty for 12 and a half hours. We were both tired and ready to get home. I had a short amount of time to get to the other side of the airport and catch my flight home or be face with spending the night on my own dime. The taxiways and ramp had plenty of snow and ice on them so I taxied in on both engines. We were marshaled into the gate and given an X to stop which I did. At that point I shut down the number 2 engine. I left the number 1 engine running to allow them to hook up ground power, as such; we had not completed the parking checklist. I then went to lift my flight bag up on to my lap to pack up. About that time I felt a bump. I had not set the parking brake and we had rolled forward. The bump I felt was the First Officer stopping the airplane. She realized what was going on and stopped the aircraft short of running the left engine into the jetway. I shut down the engine to make sure that nothing got sucked into it.

I immediate opened the window and talked to the rampers and made sure that everyone was alright. I also asked them if the aircraft was damaged to which they replied no. I and the First Officer also later verified that there was no damage to the aircraft. The rampers then got a tug and pushed us back into our parking spot with no further issue and we deplaned safely and normally. After leaving the airport it occurred to me as good measure that I should contact maintenance and ask them to check the left engine for FOD. I did and they replied that they would check it out. There were many human factors that contributed to this event; however, I do have a suggestion. We all know where the nosewheel is supposed to stop because the lead in line is marked. What if a couple of feet ahead of the line to be used (aircraft specific) we placed a single chock prior to aircraft arrival. That way if the airplane did roll a couple of feet it would stop automatically without damage to the aircraft or the equipment. It would also reduce the risk to the marshaller.

Narrative: 2

I felt the plane come to a stop, the Captain shutdown engine 2 and I then looked down to prepare for the next checklist. As I looked down to read the checklist I felt the aircraft move, I looked back up and saw that we were moving forward so I pressed the toe brakes to stop the aircraft.

Synopsis

An fatigued ERJ190 Captain failed to set the parking brake after gate arrival and consequently the aircraft rolled forward until the First Officer stopped it after sensing movement.

Time / Day

Date : 201201
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 988734
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Physiological - Other
Human Factors : Other / Unknown

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During cruise, I was involuntarily falling asleep. I placed my seat in a reclined position and slept for an extended period of time. Flying all through the night and landing at 0845 domicile time cannot be accomplished with alertness without being relieved during cruise for a rest. Although the layover included a very long rest period, the attempt at taking a nap in the late afternoon in preparation for a red eye flight is often fruitless. Afternoon noise in the hotel as well as attempting to sleep during a period that does not fit my sleep cycle results in nothing more than "toss and turn" for 3 or 4 hours. Provide a cruise relief officer and a rest station in the airplane, or officially allow and promote resting in the cockpit. Provide cockpit seats that facilitate taking a nap. Most of our 757's do not even have a head rest. Taking a nap in the pilot's chair is a painful experience. This aircraft had painfully hard seat cushions. Other solutions might be known and available in the industry.

Synopsis

B757 Captain describes his inability to stay awake during a red eye flight and offers suggestions.

Time / Day

Date : 201201
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US

Environment

Light : Dusk

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 988345
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Aircraft : Equipment Problem Dissipated

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were on leg six of a 13.5 plus hour duty day. After departure and during climb out, I noticed a CHK POSITION message on the PFD and FMS. Also, due to the nature of the departure, I noticed the FMS was in INHIBIT mode and so, having taught all the right classes on the threats associated with inhibited FMS ON, I briefed that just in case they gave us a heading to join the SID down track. After this, we became busy with ATC and were given on course. I do not remember if the CHK POSITION message disappeared or not. As we continued, I was feeling tired. Then, as we progressed enroute, I noticed again that the CHK POSITION message was present. So I mentioned to the First Officer that the message was appearing. He hadn't noticed it until then. So, I said it may have been on since takeoff, but we may have been tired to notice it. So, I said we can correct that. I looked at the set position line on page 1 of POS INIT, and noticed dashed lines. So, I told the First Officer, we can update that by going to the 2nd page and dropping the GPS position into the scratch pad and put it in the set position line on page 1. But as I put the GPS position into the set position line select, for some reason, the FMS position shifted. All of a sudden, the previous intersection was behind us and the map on the MFD shifted as well. The airplane went toward the next fix. I was looking at the FMS when the First Officer said, the FMS shifted and the airplane was turning. There was a moment of confusion at that time. I thought I'd done something wrong and immediately I centered the heading bug and asked the First Officer to ask ATC for a heading. He stated to ATC that we were having some issues with our FMS and requested a heading. They put us on a heading to the south east, I believe. Then within a few seconds of all this happening, the FMS returned to proper position. Again, I do not remember how many seconds it was, but we weren't on the heading for much time when the FMS regained proper positioning. So, we told ATC that it looked as if the FMS was working normally, and we were given direct to cypress. I made sure that as we came over a fix that ATC verified our position on radar as accurate prior to continuing on the arrival. Then, I requested a second position check over deeds from ATC, which they confirmed as accurate. We continued to our destination for a visual approach. After landing, we contacted Maintenance. In hindsight, there should have been some issues that we may not have been prepared for. It was only in cruise that I noticed how tired I was. Perhaps, I should have stated that a little earlier and cautioned my First Officer that we need to be extra careful. The only reason I updated that position was because, unaware, I thought it may have been on all the time after takeoff and we may not have noticed after my initial awareness. Also, though I noticed this message after takeoff, I realized later that I didn't mention that to the First Officer, but I did mention the FMS was in inhibit on departure. It is very difficult during these long

days to decipher between tiredness and fatigue. My experience has taught me that in critical phases of flight I tend to pay detailed attention and brief thoroughly during these long days. But when that phase is over, there's a tendency to settle down from that peak awareness of possible threats and enter into a more relaxed state to identify threats. So, to prevent errors and improve recognition of them, conversation of flying duties needs to take place. For example, though I do not know why the map shifted, perhaps I should have talked to the First Officer earlier when I saw that after takeoff the CHK POSITION message was on. Then perhaps, if he said he hadn't seen it all the while after takeoff, then maybe I would have left it alone and eventually it would have corrected itself. Also, before I push or reset any more positions, I will be asking if we accurately show on course. Invariably it always does, but I didn't think of all these points in flight at the 13th hour of six legs. I'll definitely be briefing my First Officer on these issues in the future.

Synopsis

A fatigued CRJ200 Captain noticed the FMS CHK POSITION alert on after takeoff but failed to take action or notify the First Officer until well into the flight when the GPS position was used to update the FMS.

Time / Day

Date : 201201
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2600

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : Autothrottle/Speed Control
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 10000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 988191
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew

When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

[We received] extended vectors 20 mile final after a long day. Weather was scattered and we were VMC. [We were] cleared 3,000 to intercept final "cleared ILS". I noted 3,000 until the first intersection, and then non ILS habit pattern set 2,300 for the second intersection thinking we were already past the first intersection. The auto throttles were not maintaining commanded speed selected and I was over riding to maintain speed and troubleshooting reason for throttle problem. I started down with runway in sight and cleared to land. Once I realized we had not reached the first intersection yet I disconnected autopilot and corrected altitude and continued to configure for 30 flap and uneventful landing. Be aware of fatigue onset. We had a very challenging day at SNA. BC LOC 1L, wind shear. After engine start at SNA ready for bleed off balanced field dept on 1L Tower switched runway, new clearance, TPS, FMS, etc, etc, etc. Even a generic ILS can bite you if you let your guard down. I will ensure better discussion of step down or altitude changes before initiating. We could have also just called the field and accepted a visual approach clearance. I will ensure not to confuse Non ILS procedures with ILS.

Synopsis

B737 pilot reports descending early on an ILS approach in VMC possibly due to fatigue after a very challenging day of flying.

Time / Day

Date : 201112
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport
State Reference : VA

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Dusk
Ceiling.Single Value : 1100

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : PCT
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Landing
Airspace.Class B : DCA

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 987613
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Flight Crew : Diverted

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Our day started with an early show with IMC weather prevailing on the east coast. With six legs to fly in bad weather we had a full day with minimal or no breaks, so we had both prepared by receiving a full nights rest and showed up ready for the day. We operated the first five legs pretty much on time with all flights being in IMC with a high work load. We were not fatigued; however I am sure due to the high workload from the first 11 hours of duty for the day we were most likely not as fresh as we were at the start of our day. Captain and I started this flight on time by reviewing the flight and determined that we would be operating the flight in IMC pretty much for the duration of the flight and would be expecting to shoot the LDA/DME 19 approach in DCA due to the prevailing weather in DCA. We prepared ourselves and the aircraft for what we expected to encounter on the flight. We departed with no issue and began our flight to DCA. While enroute to DCA there were no issues or anything abnormal. We checked in with Potomac Approach and were advised to expect the LDA/DME 19 into DCA, which we had expected and prepared the aircraft and reviewed the requirements for the approach as well as briefed all pertinent information. When we began the approach the weather on the field was reported as 1,100 FT overcast and 10 SM visibility, but we were advised the aircraft ahead of us went missed due to not breaking out. We continued the approach, however; we [were] both mentally prepared to go missed if need be. When we got to the approach minimums Captain called the field in sight, I looked up and saw the runway and made the leaving MDA callout and started towards the runway. Very shortly after we ended up IMC at which point we both called missed approach and executed the missed approach. We then were transferred back to Potomac and given vectors to try the approach again. While in the vectors to try the approach again Potomac advised us the reported ceiling on the field had become OVC005 and was only getting worse. We sent Dispatch and ACARS and advised them of the situation and asked if we could divert to IAD due to the proximity for our passengers as well as having a precision approach, we received no response. After a few more minutes of delaying vectors and no improvement we then sent Dispatch a second message querying them again if they agreed this was the best course of action. We received a message from Dispatch telling us to shoot the approach again even though the weather was below minimums for the non-precision approach. We sent them a message back advising them we were unable and were then sent a response to hold until our BINGO fuel then we would divert. With the weather in the area (including our alternate) deteriorating, our fuel around 3,200 LBS, numerous other aircraft ahead of us holding for DCA we decided the safe decision was to divert to ZZZ1 where we could take on more fuel and wait out the low ceilings. We advised Dispatch of our intentions via ACARS and asked Potomac Approach if we could proceed to ZZZ1. We obviously had an extremely high workload due to just going missed, bad weather, trying to prepare to go to ZZZ1 and coordinating our intentions with dispatch. While flying at 4,000 FT with a very high work load our Dispatcher then sent us another message telling us to shoot the approach again and that the ceiling was not controlling and not to divert to ZZZ1. We advised him we did not agree with his decision and were proceeding to ZZZ1. They then sent us another scathing message telling us we were to hold until bingo or shoot the approach. We all understand that an aircraft out of position is a headache for Dispatch and the company, but our primary concern and responsibility at all times is the safety of our passengers, and we felt taking the aircraft to ZZZ1 was the safest course of action. We told Dispatch we felt ZZZ1 was the best option and we were headed there, they then responded again fighting our decision. At this point we were nearing the terminal area for ZZZ1 and nearing the ILS approach we

were about to execute into ZZZ1 and did not want to argue with Dispatch and distract ourselves from our primary responsibilities. We landed in ZZZ1 in bad weather with high winds but had the aircraft and passengers safe. Throughout the next hour other we observed numerous other aircraft landing in ZZZ1 after diverting from DCA due to the weather remaining below landing minimums. I am writing this report because I believe Captain and I did everything we should have done to ensure safety of our flight but received instructions NUMEROUS times from our Dispatcher to continue trying to get into DCA for what I feel to keep the aircraft in position for the next revenue flight. In times of high workload especially with bad weather and after a long duty day, I would hope and expect that a company Dispatcher would solely have our and our passenger's safety in mind; in this situation it did not appear to be the case.

Synopsis

CRJ200 First Officer describes a long duty day of IMC flying that culminates in a missed approach at DCA. With no real prospect of weather improvement at DCA the crew elects to divert. The Dispatcher strongly suggests that the crew hold until minimum fuel or attempt another approach. The crew declines.

Time / Day

Date : 201112
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CRW.Airport
State Reference : WV
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3100

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility : Icing
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : CRW
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Nav In Use.Localizer/Glideslope/ILS : Runway 23
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class C : CRW
Maintenance Status.Released For Service : Y

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 985835
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Other / Unknown
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Terrain Warning
When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Aircraft : Equipment Problem Dissipated

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

While being vectored for an ILS to Runway 23 in CRW, we received a terrain warning. On the downwind leg (approximately 5 miles abeam the runway) our clearance was to 3,100 FT. The altitude was confirmed set in the altitude alerter. During the shallow descent approximately 900 FPM and almost level at 3,100 FT is when we received the alert. Minimum vectoring altitude for this sector is 3,100 FT according to the Approach Controller. Responding to the alert, we climbed to 3,700 FT and the alert was extinguished. At that time we alerted the Controller of our situation. We were then vectored for a base leg and the approach continued without incident. No known error was made by the crew and all standards and procedures were followed to the best of our abilities. Crew had been on duty 14 hours at the time of this incident. Multiple aircraft swaps due to maintenance during the duty period. This duty followed a 12.5 hour shift the previous day with 9 hours on the ground. [Suggest] scheduling with safety and common sense in mind.

Synopsis

CRJ200 Captain, on a downwind vector for Runway 23 at CRW and descending to 3,100 FT, experiences a terrain warning and climbs to 3,700 FT. ATC advises that the MVA is 3,100 FT and continues vectors for the approach.

Time / Day

Date : 201112
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : Turbine Engine
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 984126
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Workload

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Declared Emergency

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : MEL
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

While enroute a moderate vibration developed and was felt in the airframe and the control yoke. Thrust and airspeed were reduced to 250 KTS and the vibration subsided. We advised Approach of our condition and he vectored us for an approach to Runway 02. We declared an emergency and landed safely without incident.

Contributing factors [and considerations for the emergency declaration] included: Imminent engine shut down, possible flight control failure, IMC conditions, aircraft control, deviation to another airport facility for better emergency handling, heavy fatigue on this leg seven and extremely long day with multiple aircraft swaps and multiple deferrals on equipment throughout the day on every leg.

Synopsis

A CRJ flight crew experienced apparent engine vibration just prior to descent for landing. They declared an emergency and landed without incident.

Factors contributing to the flight crew's ordeal included: fatigue, multiple legs; and multiple aircraft swaps each with deferred maintenance items.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference : NM
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 22000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dusk

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAB
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class A : ZAB

Component

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 984026
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR

Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

On hand off to ABQ Center from LAX Center on the GEELA 4 we began to receive numerous airspeed assignments and revised altitude clearances. We ended up at 260 KIAS and were cleared in multiple step downs to 17,000. During this the FMC seemed to be responding more slowly after every speed change was entered, in particular the auto throttles were slow to respond to the new path. Just after crossing LZIRD we were told to descend via the GEELA 4 Runway 25L. Because of the step downs we were above the profile and I advised the Controller that we would be high over HYDRR. The Controller gave us relief on that altitude and said we were fine "as long as we made the 12,000/250 KIAS restriction at GEELA. There is no published restriction like that for GEELA. There has been a NOTAM for several months now to cross GEELA at or below 16,000 at 250 KIAS. (I do not understand why this has not shown up on the plates.) The Controller was extremely busy so there really wasn't a good opportunity to query him about the clearance. We saw that we could make the restriction with use of spoilers and so complied with the clearance. (Left to its own devices the VNAV path normally crosses GEELA at around 12,500 FT.) Also at this point the auto throttles failed to respond appropriately to for the VNAV path and we had to disconnect auto throttles, come out of VNAV and use Level Three automation, requiring a reset of the MCP altitude to protect the next fix. At that point we were handed off to PHX Approach, who continued to issue further speed reductions. The task loading did not let up until about an eight mile final with hand off to PHX Tower. At that point I noticed that the landing lights were not on and that my altimeter was set at 29.92. The First Officer's (pilot flying) was set correctly at 30.18. It was apparent that we had not done the Descent/Approach checklist. I followed by ensuring lights, autobrake, and other items were set correctly. Landing was uneventful. The First Officer and I spoke about the event afterward and we concluded that the multiple speed changes, step down altitudes and a clearance to descend via right at FL180 task-loaded us to the point where we missed the checklist.

1. The optimum descent profiles work very well as long as the automation is allowed to fly it without interruption. The more often ATC adjusts speed and/or altitude the more likely the opportunity for error. Task loading under these circumstances triples. Some arrivals are more tolerant of this than others. The GEELA 4 for some reason seems to be the most difficult when receiving multiple speed adjustments. A vector off the arrival and then back on seems to work better than constantly adjusting the speeds.
2. This was leg five of a long day. Neither of us was as sharp as were on leg one.
3. For reasons I do not understand, the FMC interface with auto throttles seems to be less robust with update 10.7 than it was with update 10.5.

A revision of the GEELA 4 might be in order. Based on the number of times I personally have flown it without speed adjustments I don't think it works well at all for ATC. Also, if there is an altitude and speed restriction regularly used on an approach, that information belongs ON THE PLATE, not as local knowledge or as a NOTAM. We probably should watch 10.7 equipped airplanes for a while to see if there is some underlying issue. I have seen all our airplanes "act up" to a certain extent, but today this aircraft warranted a write-up.

Synopsis

A B737-300 Captain reported difficulty complying with the GEELA 4 RNAV arrival to PHX due primarily to numerous airspeed assignments and revised altitude clearances. On final approach it was discovered that the Captain's altimeter was not set to local and the descent and approach checklists had not been accomplished.

Time / Day

Date : 201112
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport
State Reference : GA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ATL
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B : ATL

Component

Aircraft Component : INS / IRS / IRU
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 983158
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : FLC Overrode Automation

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

As we approached Glide Slope (GS) intercept I looked away briefly to consult the approach plate. The First Officer made a comment that directed my attention back to the instruments, at which time I saw the GS capture and the aircraft [start to] climb. There was also an occasional, brief red GS flag. Apparently a weak and fluctuating GS indication had caused the autopilot to capture early.

By the time I reacted and disconnected the autopilot the GS had begun to move back to its correct indication and the aircraft was following it but we had climbed to about 7,400 FT. During this time the First Officer's side displayed the correct GS indication without any flags. We reported the irregularity to ATC. They queried other aircraft but no one else reported any problem. After assuming manual control for a moment the GS signal returned to normal. I called for the autopilot again and the rest of the approach proceeded normally. ATC said nothing about our altitude, and there was no TCAS indication. No apparent problem was caused. I entered the GS receiver discrepancy in the logbook.

Factors included a high workload, IMC weather, an unusually strong headwind and a duty period that followed an 8-hour reduced-rest overnight. Error: Self-distracted; momentary inattention to basic instrument scan.

Possible solution include: Avoid complacency. Avoid putting too much trust in the automation. I obviously chose the wrong moment to glance away; otherwise I know I would have reacted much quicker. I should have asked the First Officer to look up the detail I needed to confirm.

Finally, the company should avoid scheduling reduced rest overnights. After a typical delay the night before we ended up with less than eight hours at the hotel itself. Five to six hours of sleep is just not enough for me. Even with 21 years of seniority on the -200 it is no longer possible for me to bid around these schedules. I don't know for sure whether that was a factor in today's event, but I do know these overnights pose an [undeniable] safety threat.

Synopsis

A CRJ-200 flight crew experienced a momentary deviation from their cleared GS intercept altitude when the autopilot intercepted a false glide slope and climbed in response. Distractions and possible fatigue were cited as factors in the Captain's delayed response and return to their clearance.

Time / Day

Date : 201112
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Cargo / Freight
Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 42
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 68
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 983056
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

First Officer was flying. I was pilot not flying. We were on our second leg of a back side of the clock launch. We were arriving into the airport. Previous clearance was to proceed to the NDB, descend to 4,000. ATC asked if we had airport in sight. I responded, negative we are looking directly into the sun. ATC said no problem. First Officer set 4,000 in ALT window and I confirmed 4,000. We were cleared via the RNAV 26 charted visual approach and to cross the next intersection at 4,000. Approaching the intersection we were able to see airport and the First Officer was slowing to begin configuring for approach and landing. At the intersection I noticed that we were at 3,600 FT descending. I immediately said to "climb back to 4,000". The First Officer aggressively climbed back to 4,000. ATC came up and said to climb. We quickly leveled at 4,000 and reported level 4,000 to ATC. ATC said thank you and did not seem to have a problem with it.

We landed uneventfully. We were both tired. I was a bit distracted looking directly into a bright rising sun and trying to locate the airport and runway visually. The cockpit glare was intense.

Both the Captain and First Officer are new on the airplane and had less than 100 hours. The company has a waiver for us to fly together with less than 75 hours in type.

In the highly demanding Europe environment, I do not think this is a good idea.

Synopsis

A low time in type B757 flight crew failed to cross an intersection at the prescribed altitude when flying a charted RNAV Visual approach to a foreign airport. Fatigue and inexperience in type were cited as contributing factors.

Time / Day

Date : 201112
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZDC.ARTCC
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 23000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDC
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Heavy Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Cargo / Freight
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class A : ZDC

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 982948
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On climb out, we were given a heading, and then issued direct to MXE VOR. First Officer was flying and I entered into FMC direct to MXE, however, as pilot not flying, I did not double check First Officer selecting NAV in MCP. (First Officer remained in Heading select). Washington Center asked if we were going direct MXE as we were already 10 miles off. [We] proceeded to MXE. The fatigue factor: We both had made numerous comments concerning our level of fatigue prior to this flight. The van driver had even asked me if I was sick due to my lethargic pace delivering load plan down the stairs to load master. This was our first night out for the week and this trip extended beyond the normal hours we are accustomed to flying. We both had made several small mistakes prior to this event. I have found (after 24 years) It is impossible to adjust your body and sleep patterns to varying schedules, especially when these schedules extend beyond normal arrival times, as is usually the case with re-routes, extra sections or other contributing factors. Flipping day/night schedules nearly always results in an extended period of being awake which contributes to a level of fatigue during any adjusted duty period. I am certainly not trying to make excuses for my error in not double checking the First Officer, however, I can clearly speak on behalf of the First Officer and I that our level of awareness was greatly diminished by the fatigue we were experiencing.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain describes a track deviation that occurs after being cleared direct and entering direct in the FMC but not selecting NAV on the MCP. Fatigue is reported to be a significant factor.

Time / Day

Date : 201112
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport
State Reference : GA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : A80
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B : ATL

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 16000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 8000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 982491
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Aircraft TA
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 2000
Miss Distance.Vertical : 250
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

[We were] cleared for the visual approach near PENCL Intersection for Runway 10 at ATL. The autopilot was on and we were flying a heading of 070 degrees to join the final approach coarse and descending to 4,000 FT. Sky was clear and visibility unrestricted. Prior to localizer coming alive, we were slightly high on the glideslope. I reset the altitude alerter and selected vertical speed on the flight control panel in order to keep our descent going to capture the glideslope. In the meantime, the localizer started to center up. With the preoccupation of the glideslope, I either did not select APPR mode, or did not press the button hard enough to arm the APPR mode. We flew through the localizer, at which point the Captain stated that we were not armed for the approach. He disconnected the autopilot and turned the aircraft back to join the final approach course. We received a Traffic Alert as we were turning back to the localizer. The Approach Controller then advised a turn to the localizer after we had initiated our turn and pointed out traffic on the parallel Runway, 9R. We intercepted the LOC and landed with no further incident. This was the last leg of a five leg day at the end of a three day trip. I believe the combination of everything happening at once, with the glideslope, localizer, resetting the altitude alerter and Vertical speed caused just enough of a distraction to lead to us not double checking to make sure the APPR mode was selected on the Flight Control Panel. Sometimes complacency combined with a little fatigue at just the right (or wrong) time can create a serious situation in just a matter of seconds.

Synopsis

A Regional Jet First Officer reported not arming the approach during a visual approach to Runway 10 at ATL resulting in an overshoot and a TCAS TA. The Captain detected the deviation and took control to return to the localizer. Fatigue was cited as a contributing factor.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BOS.Airport
State Reference : MA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 981813
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Diverted

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The flight time in the flight release was eight hours six minutes. We spent over an hour on the ground in EGCC awaiting the final weight and balance. In flight, the First Officer and I decided that we were too tired to continue the flight [to

scheduled destination]. We diverted to BOS. Either put an IRO on the flight or deal with flights occasionally diverting.

Synopsis

An international two person flight crew became fatigued on a westbound trans-Atlantic flight and diverted to BOS for rest.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Thunderstorm
Weather Elements / Visibility : Fog
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 981506
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

[There was] weather en route and at our foreign destination, [so we] held [and then had to] divert for fuel. [We then] flew to the destination. Conferring with the First Officer, we both felt we were OK to fly back to our U.S. destination. Then, after brake release, we had problems with our clearance, loads, fog rolled in, ground operations came to a crawl, and planes backed up. By the time we took off, the sun was rising. We worked our way around weather in climb and initially en route. Once we were clear of all the challenges that kept us "pumped up" fatigue slammed into us. I have flown this sequence 3 times previously in the last week, back to back, and I have three more, back to back. I knew fatigue was a factor under normal/adverse conditions. I should have called in fatigued when we got the turn to our destination from the divert station. I should have returned to the gate and called in fatigued when we were delayed on the ground.

Honest reflection: I failed to project "fatigue" factor. I knew from past flights fatigue would be a factor without throwing in a diversion. Though the First Officer and I felt we were fine at the gate, I failed to project the impact of fatigue. The First Officer had never been to this foreign airport and had never flown this sequence.

Recommendation: 1) Emphasis projection of "fatigue." You may not "feel that fatigued" at the gate, especially flying all night. 2) Eliminate this turn. Between the single runway operations, weather, holding, high altitude, 737 performance, flying all night with a 2 pilot crew, etc., 90% of the time it doesn't work as scheduled. It may be "legal" on paper, but it isn't "smart."

Synopsis

A B737-800 Captain reported fatigue during a return flight from a foreign destination following a divert for weather, fog, clearance difficulties and weight and balance issues.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night
Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B747-400
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 4
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Oceanic
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : Powerplant Fuel Valve
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 171
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 6000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 981257
Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 18000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 140
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 8000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 981255
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 981461
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 4

Reference : 4
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 14000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 6000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 981245

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Declared Emergency
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew : Inflight Shutdown

Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Result.Flight Crew : Diverted

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft

Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

As Captain, I was making up my bunk after briefing the relief pilots. Before I was able to complete making up the bunk, the relief pilots rang the call bell. I returned to the cockpit where the relief pilots pointed out the loss of #4 Engine (Eng). Several EICAS messages were in view. The engine instruments indicated about 26% N2 and 0% N1. Oil pressure was 0; no excessive EGT had been identified before the engine failure. We were at FL350 on Track 3 with several aircraft in our vicinity, the closest at FL340 about 10 NM behind us. I elected to attempt a restart of Eng #4. When the #4 fuel cutoff was placed in run, the Eng 4 Fuel Valve EICAS returned. We aborted the start attempt. We reviewed the irregular for this EICAS which indicated, "No Restart to be Attempted." We had already selected EO (Engine Out) Speed on the VNAV page because of our altitude and proximity to the traffic below. We asked for descent to FL300 and were denied due to traffic. We declared an emergency, transmitted on VHF 123.45 our position and intentions, turned on all landing lights and proceeded to offset 15 NM south of track and started our descent to FL300 maintaining separation from our closest and only displayed traffic with reference to the TCAS display. Paralleling our track now at FL300 with #4 engine shut down, we discussed, via SATCOM, our situation with Dispatch and Maintenance. Discussions included selection of an appropriate diversion station. Continuation to our filed destination would have resulted in a significant increase in expected fuel flow/burn with an estimated arrival fuel of 15,000 LBS as computed by the FMC. I selected a nearer domestic airport as our diversion site with the concurrence of Dispatch. We received clearance via CPDLC to proceed direct. Reviewing our checklists and procedures, we selected LRC on the VNAV page which resulted in a much more comfortable indicated speed (we were still in E/O SPD because of our limitation on descent clearance earlier in the event). The flight attendants were kept in the loop as much as possible as early as possible considering the high demands of communication required outside the aircraft. They later mentioned that when all the landing lights came on they were expecting a call referencing some irregularity. They got the call and were told about the engine shut down. Passengers were provided with a briefing from me about the events that had taken place when we were about two hours from landing. We were met with several emergency vehicles because of our classification as an Emergency Aircraft. The pilot crew performed with the highest degree of professionalism in a difficult, sleep deprived situation. Coordination and mutual backup was evident and welcome in nearly every aspect of this event.

Narrative: 2

With some degree of fatigue, and sleepiness from getting up from my break, I observed, inquired, and participated in discussions and completion of Communications with ATC, Dispatch, Purser, and passengers. Also, discussions about aircraft performance, selection of new destination, completion of flight manual checklists, diversion checklist, receipt of new flight plan from Dispatch. When I was satisfied that everything was accomplished that could be done at that time, I returned to the bunk to finish my break. I was back in the First Officer's

seat at least one and a half hours before landing. I resumed the duties as the flying First Officer. The crew briefed me on everything that transpired up to this point; and then we briefed the remainder of the flight including a missed approach with an engine inoperative.

Narrative: 3

[Narrative #3 has no additional information]

Narrative: 4

Just as we started our shift, engine four flamed out. I chimed Captain who wasn't even in bunk yet. First Officer was flying. I ran Engine Shutdown Checklist and Engine Restart Checklist with the Captain. There was some discussion about attempting the restart since we saw Fuel Valve on the EICAS, but after engine shut down, the EICAS message went away. Engine would not restart. No fuel flow. Captain talked with Dispatch about possible divers. Dispatch was not sure they could provide accurate landing fuel information on three engines with the new flight planning system. Dispatch then suggested a foreign airport behind us or a domestic airport. We looked at the distance to two domestic airports and the foreign airport. One domestic and the foreign airports were the same distance but the foreign airport was into a headwind. While waiting for Dispatch we were unable to maintain FL350. Requested lower from ATC, but another aircraft (I tried to contact them) was below and behind us at FL340. We declared an Emergency, gave general position information via HF, offset the airway and descended to FL300. We then notified ATC and Dispatch of our intention to go to a domestic airport.

Synopsis

A B747-400 engine flamed out at FL340 during oceanic cruise. Crew was unable to restart it. An emergency was declared, the track offset, a descent to FL300 completed and the flight diverted to a domestic airport.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : SLT.VORTAC
State Reference : PA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 37000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOB
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A319
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use.VOR / VORTAC : STL
Flight Phase : Cruise
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class A : ZOB

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 981249
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Undershoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was the pilot not flying (PNF). We were cruising east-bound at FL370 about 40 miles west of SLT. ATC assigned us to cross SLT VOR at FL350. I acknowledged on the radio and set the new altitude in the FCU window. The PF programmed the crossing restriction in the FMS. I noted the white top of descent arrow appear on the route many miles ahead. At this point it had been a very long day and I was feeling tired and fatigued. I allowed myself to get distracted and didn't notice that we had flown past the white arrow. Over SLT, still at FL370, I immediately realized we had missed the descent point. The PF immediately descended the aircraft to FL350 and I reported the altitude change (leaving FL370 for FL350) to ATC. We arrived at FL350 a few miles past SLT. ATC acknowledged our descent report. There did not appear to be any conflict with other aircraft due to our late descent. With this error I am reminded that, no matter how tired I am, I cannot allow myself to get distracted at such a critical time. Knowing that there is an assigned descent point ahead, I need to remain vigilant to execute the descent as assigned. I also think I allowed myself to relax because I was the PNF.

Synopsis

Fatigue was cited as a factor when an A319 missed a crossing restriction.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 4200
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 980529
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

I was given a very late night short call assignment shortly after noon for the next day. I was called at mid morning on the next day and told that my rest was to be reset for a mid-evening departure. I fell asleep at approximately an hour or so before midnight on the night before the trip. I awoke at about three hours later and I don't sleep soundly so as to listen and be ready for a possible phone call in the early AM. I questioned the crew desk on the prudence and the safety of this assignment and the supervisor laughed it off. I told them to have a standby Captain ready in the event the flight was delayed. The flight left on time and by the time we were at the midnight portion of the flight the First Officer started to become exhausted and started to nod off. He had to get up several times to make himself alert. By the last hour of flight we had both had it and had to deal with an arrival change and 2 runway changes. This late night flight needs to be assigned to west coast crews or a reserve that is rested at the hotel. And at the very least assign a reserve that is at a more appropriate time. When there are trips that operate out of the domicile with late departures, then the crew desk should assign a daily short call with that in mind. This isn't farm equipment we're handling. And the crew desk isn't riding on the back of the tractor.

Synopsis

An air carrier Captain described fatigue after his reserve trip departure time was reset from an early afternoon departure to a late night departure after poor sleep planned for the earlier flight.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 035
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 10
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10
Light : Night
Ceiling.Single Value : 2000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.CTAF : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Dash 8-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Military : 3
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6400
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 350
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 980396

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Fatigue
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : VFR In IMC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Event flight was a scheduled Part 121 airline segment. Approaching our filed destination, ASOS reported 2,000 BKN ceiling. Airport was not in sight within 10 NM at 11,000 MSL, so we asked Center for the ILS/DME 21, for which we were cleared. Upon turning inbound from the procedure turn, Runway 21 was clearly visible from approach lights to end bars. Since it is often impossible to reach Center from the airline ramp at this airport, our airline's flights will often cancel IFR while airborne, as permitted by our Ops Specs. It appeared to me that the glideslope would easily take us below the clouds over the airport area, so I canceled IFR at approximately 10 NM from the Runway 21 threshold. Center switched us to a 1200 squawk and cleared us off their frequency. At approximately 5 NM it became apparent that the wind was carrying clouds across our approach path at an altitude that would intersect our approach path. The First Officer was able to gently maneuver around some of the clouds, but we did pass through a couple of them. We could always see the glow of the approach lights and were only IMC for a few seconds. The approach and landing were completed without further incident. In hindsight, I should not have canceled IFR. We were running about 40 minutes late and I did not want to deal with the hassle of contacting the AFSS (which involves transmitting on their receiver frequency and listening on the airport VOR). I clearly misinterpreted the cloud base height and wind-induced cloud movement. Furthermore, I should have consulted my First Officer for his opinion before canceling IFR, which he diplomatically pointed out to me after shutdown. I placed our flight in the position of being VFR (with no active flight plan) in IMC conditions, in an area and at an altitude with spotty radar coverage, with significant rising terrain to our immediate north. DUMB, DUMB, DUMB! My only defense is that it was well past midnight and we had flown five legs and endured an hour-long return to gate at our departure airport. Even so, it is my responsibility to assess my mental condition and make a go/no-go decision accordingly. Valuable lesson learned.

Synopsis

A DHC8 Captain canceled IFR on a night approach to a CTAF airport and subsequently the aircraft momentarily entered IMC conditions. Situational awareness, fatigue and CRM were components in this error.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 20500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 4500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 980270
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew

Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

Our outbound flight was delayed for five hours due to inbound\mechanical delay from its originating station. The flight attendants do a turn so inbound flight attendants are the outbound flight attendants. I figured that since the flight was so late they had re-crewed the flight. They had not, during the flight I found out from the flight attendants that the crew desk had asked the flight attendants to waive. The flight attendants had been on duty since midmorning, so they had already been on duty without rest at our departure time of almost 13 hours. With a scheduled arrival after midnight this means they would have been on duty over 17 and 1/2 hours! I don't know the FAR's for flight attendants but they insisted this was legal and it was obvious they were scared of the crew desk. Their fatigue factor was very high, and they were obviously struggling to stay awake. My concern as a Captain is if an emergency developed during the flight that my cabin crew would not be able to perform due to fatigue. At times when I would talk with the cabin crew during the flight they were almost incoherent and struggling to understand what I was telling them, they were so tired. This is a definite safety factor.

Synopsis

A B767 Captain reported the flight attendant crew on the inbound aircraft turned around on his outbound flight but because of a previous maintenance delay would be on duty for 17.5 hours at the destination and were so fatigued they were unsafe.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 31500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 980205
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

[We were] climbing to assigned altitude of FL310 when I engaged vertical speed mode of autopilot and disabled altitude hold and climbed through assigned altitude. I realized my mistake at FL313 and airplane momentarily reached FL315 as I descended back to FL310. No other traffic was in the vicinity and no loss of separation occurred. I feel the error occurred because of fatigue due to waking up early that morning. This was day four of a four day trip in which I had flown nights the previous three days followed by an early morning check in after a scheduled 11 hour 24 minute layover. I should have verbalized my action of changing the autopilot mode to allow the pilot not flying to trap the error.

Synopsis

A B717 First Officer reported climbing through the assigned flight level by engaging the vertical speed mode of the autopilot and disabling the altitude hold function. Fatigue was cited as a contributing factor.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 979001
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Unsafe schedule/departure time! Flying as "back-side" of the clock as possible with only a two man crew, this is an accident waiting to happen. The crew was

constantly falling asleep about two hours into the flight. The cockpit crew was completely unable to handle even the smallest of emergencies had one arisen. Even a go-around could have ended in disaster with that level of fatigue! Put an East Coast crew on this trip. Leaving at 0300 body clock instead of midnight (for a West Coast crew) allows for at least some sleep prior to departure; the same as the 0600 East Coast departures that the West Coast crew frequently fly. West Coast crew are seldom able to get any sleep in the afternoon prior due to the time variance from normal sleep patterns, i.e. trying to fall asleep at 1700 vs. a normal 2100. An East Coast crew would be in that perfect zone for a nap; 1700 local is 2000 body clock. Also, a layover for an East Coast crew does not require them to leave their home 1-2 hours before sign in to allow for traffic, the parking lot, bus schedule, etc. Either put a third pilot on all departures > 2000 body clock, give the trip to East Coast crew (in this scenario), or get rid of the trip and add another 0600 departure. This is the most unsafe trip I have done in over 21 years at this company.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain describes the rigors of flying a red eye from west to east with only two pilots and believes that crew based in the east would be better suited to this flying.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : STL.Tower
State Reference : MO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Rain

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : STL
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Taxi

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 13000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 978769
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N

When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

STL was reporting approximately 4,000-5,000 overcast with about 4-5 miles of visibility in light to moderate rain. It had been raining for several hours. The First Officer wisely selected medium brakes and flew a perfect approach and touchdown. When the First Officer applied manual braking at 100 KTS I noticed the runway was slightly slippery due to the rain. I took control of the airplane at 60 KTS just before a high-speed turn off. Under dry conditions, making the high-speed turnoff would have been no problem. I elected to take the next one that was a 90 degree turn. As I took control of the aircraft ATC told us to exit at the high-speed. I told the First Officer I will take the next one and he told ATC "we'll take the 90, cleared to cross Runway 12R".

The ATC call came at a time when I was more concerned with getting the aircraft safely off the runway than hearing everything the Controller said and I was more concerned with ATC knowing that we would NOT be taking the turnoff he instructed us to take. The Controller came back by stating that there was traffic on a 1 mile final behind us. I clearly heard the First Officer state that we were cleared to cross 12R to the Controller who did not challenge it. The 90 degree turnoff makes for a quick arrival at 12R and as the nose of the aircraft approached 12R the Tower Controller stated that we were cleared to cross 12R and that our instructions had been to contact Ground Control. I assume that means that Tower never had cleared us across 12R BEFORE that time, but the Controller never challenged the First Officer on his readback.

A different air carrier Captain was sitting in the jumpseat at the time and we had the speaker on to keep him in the loop. We all discussed it after arriving at the gate and agreed that we could not remember the exact wording of the Tower Controller and as to whether he had cleared us across 12R prior to our approaching it. We were all sure that the First Officer had stated that we were cleared to cross and the Controller never questioned his readback. Technically the Tower Controller gave us our crossing clearance just prior to the aircraft crossing the runway and we had already cleared the runway visually both directions.

ATC is notorious for talking to us at that critical moment on the runway when the Captain takes control of the aircraft and we are trying to taxi clear! Very difficult with a normal day/VFR day and makes it even harder with lower weather conditions. I should have been more alert to the clearance we were given. We were at the end of a long 4-day trip and ready to go home. I also take responsibility for NOT questioning the clearance prior to crossing the runway when all I had heard was the First Officer's readback and the response to the readback.

Synopsis

A breakdown in communications with the Tower contributed to a near runway incursion after landing by an air carrier flight crew in STL.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked
Route In Use : Oceanic

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 978642
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Fatigue
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected.Other
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

I flew a domestic flight sequence planned for a total flight time of 7:54 minutes. Actual flight time exceeded 8 hours. I was scheduled for an international flight dispatched under flag rules the following day. Based on FAR 121.481(c) I required 18 hours of rest prior to beginning the international trip.

When I contacted the company to address the issue at the conclusion of the domestic trip they told me I was legal and ordered me to fly the international leg with less than 18 hours rest. I accepted the international trip based on the company's assertion that I was legal.

My subsequent research found no basis for the company's opinion, thus prompting this report.

Synopsis

After flying in excess of eight hours the day prior, an A320 First Officer was ordered by his airline to fly an international trip the next day without the minimum intervening rest break required by FAR.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : VTBS.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Ground : VTBS
ATC / Advisory.Tower : VTBS
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 3
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Takeoff
Flight Phase : Taxi

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 22000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 750
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 978161
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Excursion : Ramp
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Bird / Animal
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Fatigue played a large factor in this chain of events. Copilot leg, in VTBS (BKK), day 6 of an 8 day trip, 11 hours out of home time. Ground power dropped off at gate. We had to reestablish power and start over again after full setup. Pushback clearance told us to face east. We did not push back quite as far we should have, but I assumed ground crew knew where to be. We pushed just far enough that I could not see T9. 20-9B/C shows taxi routing to be in to ramp via T9, out by T8. Clearance to taxi from ramp was taxi T9, Gulf, hold short H2. I taxied via T8 per the chart, but realized my mistake, and cut across the ramp after making sure it was clear. Ramp did not like this, said should have had clearance to deviate, so I apologized and told him we read back T9, not T8. Silence, then he said it was okay. On take off, a very large bird, a crane came across the nose of the aircraft headed straight for the engine 1 nacelle. I was sure we hit it. Told Tower, all engine indications were normal. On climbout, ATC asked about aircraft status and damage if any. During evaluation, ATC cleared us unrestricted direct to PAPRA. It was then we accelerated to 280 KTS below 10,000 FT. To many distractions, I should have done a better job of oversight and task management. [We] resumed 250 KTS below 10,000 FT after we entered direct PAPRA into FMC and executed. [We] advised Dispatch and Line Maintenance of possible bird strike.

Synopsis

An Air Carrier Captain on day six of an eight day trip failed to follow the prescribed VTBS (BKK) taxi route from the departure gate, an error mostly the result of fatigue. On takeoff the aircraft may have hit a very large bird.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked

Component

Aircraft Component : Autopilot
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Failed

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 978125
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person : Company
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Other / Unknown
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 978588

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Detector.Person : Other Person
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : MEL
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

When we arrived at the aircraft, Maintenance was working on fixing the autopilot and the right fuel pump. They ended up deferring both. The inbound crew told us Maintenance had installed a new autopilot two legs prior. They flew the first leg and it worked but the next leg (to where we were picking it up) it had failed again. The Captain also told me the flight directors were not following heading commands. The mechanic informed us there was a perfectly good spare aircraft at the remote pad that was all ready to go and had no deferred items.

I called Control and told them I did not want to take our scheduled ship to ZZZ because the autopilot was deferred and it is a long leg, the return leg would be at night, we had to also go to ZZZ2 which has complicated arrival procedures involving multiple step downs and that the previous pilot said the flight directors were not following heading commands correctly. I did not feel it was safe for us to fly. I strongly suggested we take the spare aircraft as the mechanic told us it was in excellent condition and ready to go.

Control told me to call a Chief Pilot and tell him I was refusing the aircraft and then we would go to plan b, swapping aircrafts. After receiving no reply to a text message I called the Chief Pilot on duty. He was very aggressive with me on the phone and told me I absolutely HAD to take the plane. I was refusing a Maintenance cleared aircraft and that I must take it because I am letting down all of the passengers that want and need to get home. He continued to verbally assault me by questioning my pilot skills and asking me if I thought I was a pilot and whether I could fly a plane without autopilot because according to him I obviously could not do that. He kept trying to force me to take the plane, all the while threatening me if I didn't take it. He told me if I refused the aircraft I would be in serious trouble with the company and that I would have to answer to "higher ups".

I cannot account for the number of times he told me I "must" and "have to" take that aircraft, but it was more times than I can count on two hands. His voice was aggressive and threatening. I felt I was being "pilot pushed" and coerced into doing something both my First Officer and I decided was not safe. After that phone call he called me again from his cellphone. His words were exactly, "YOU ARE GOING TO TAKE THAT AIRPLANE, YOU HAVE TO TAKE THAT AIRPLANE". I told him I had every right to refuse it. He then told me I was removed without pay IMMEDIATELY.

Scheduling then called out a reserve Captain to fly the trip. When the crew finally left for the scheduled round trip they were given another aircraft. So, ultimately, the crew never had to take broken ship. However, when they ultimately returned, they were instructed to take broken airplane on the final leg to ZZZ2. The Captain refused the aircraft and without, any further discussion, they were given another ship with a working autopilot.

In conclusion, the Chief Pilot threatened me with disciplinary action and verbally abused me, saying that I was a lesser pilot unable to perform my duties. He told me I was failing my passengers and creating unnecessary delays to the operation.

I want a written apology for his comments and full back pay. He needs to go to sensitivity training and learn how to conduct himself in a professional manner. He created a hostile work environment in the form of "pilot pushing". Threatening and concluding the matter with disciplinary action, removed from flight status with no pay. His threatening and harassing manner should be dealt with immediately so this does not happen again and any pilot with the company can safely and without persecution act within his/her right as a PIC to refuse an aircraft that he/she does not feel safe flying. Human Resources needs to investigate this matter as I know for a fact that another veteran female captain at our airline has experienced similar issues with this Chief Pilot.

Narrative: 2

I was the Chief Pilot on call. I received a call that evening from a Dispatch Manager who advised that Captain X was refusing an aircraft due to a deferred autopilot. She was just giving me a heads up that they had instructed Captain X to call a Chief Pilot to get better guidance. I waited approximately 15 minutes for a call from Captain X. Once I decided that Captain X wasn't going to call I took it upon myself to call her.

When I got hold of Captain X she informed me that she was refusing the aircraft based on the fact that the autopilot was deferred and the scheduled flight 1:45 would be too fatiguing. That comment prompted me to ask how long their duty day had been. She replied that she and her crew had just started their day and just came from the hotel. I then asked what the weather was like. To which she replied she didn't really know. I asked her what Maintenance was saying about the autopilot to which she replied she didn't know. She stated that the previous crew had written the autopilot up upon arrival. I asked what the other crew was reporting to be the problem with the autopilot. She said that they had written, "Auto pilot will not track in HDG or NAV mode."

At one point she accused me of "Pilot Pushing". To which I replied that I wasn't. She never once stated that she felt unsafe flying with that particular deferral. I did say, "You're a pilot and expected to be able to fly without the autopilot on certain occasions." At that time she adamantly refused the aircraft stating that there was a spare on the pad that they could take. I then spoke with the Dispatcher again and relayed the message that she is refusing to take the aircraft. A short while later I received a call from the Director of Operations who asked what the situation was with Captain X. I stated that she was refusing the aircraft based on the fact that she thought the flight would be too fatiguing given the autopilot deferral. To which he and I agreed there was nothing unsafe, or illegal about the deferral.

Based on the fact that the weather was good, they just started their duty day, and the aircraft was completely airworthy I once again called Captain X and urged her to fly the flight as scheduled. When she didn't comply I said I am pulling you off the trip pending further review. In response she threatened to, "sic a lawyer on me."

I ended the conversation by saying OK. I then coordinated with scheduling to pull her off the trip pending further investigation, and also to re-crew the flight. Shortly thereafter I once again called Captain X and left a message asking her to not leave town, as the station Chief Pilot would be in contact with her to set up a meeting in the morning. The entire conversation was cordial and never seemed to be heated. We did disagree but it was completely respectful.

Synopsis

A conflict arose between the Captain of a CRJ-200 and her Chief Pilot over the propriety of dispatching a flight with the autopilot deferred inoperative; the Captain believing it would be too fatiguing and the Chief Pilot asserting the flight was appropriate because the MEL did not require the autopilot to be operative. The Captain refused the aircraft and was removed from flight status pending resolution of their differences.

Time / Day

Date : 201111
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MIA.Airport
State Reference : FL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : MIA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Taxi

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 978064
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 978144

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Lack of sufficient rest and phone calls from Crew Scheduling during previous night at four separate times to notify me of this flight assignment for night of the occurrence. I was awake for 26 hours when we arrived at the hotel. Was on standby reserve the night before. These schedulers need some common sense when contacting crews for flight assignments. I turned left onto Runway 12 in MIA instead of right to 8R. There were no conflicts, ATC was notified when in the turn and they cleared us for takeoff on 12. Call in fatigued if fatigued instead of trying to save Scheduling's face over and over again.

Narrative: 2

Taxied out on Taxiway Q to hold short of Runway 8R. We were cleared for immediate take off on Runway 8R, with a Citation on an 8 mile final for 8R. We performed the Before Takeoff checklist final items (below the line). I noted the time and takeoff fuel. As I looked up, the Captain had taxied forward and was turning left onto Runway 12 instead of turning right onto 8R. I called out the error but we were already on the runway. I then called ATC (Tower) and advised them of our mistake. Tower responded with "Cleared for takeoff Runway 12." No other traffic was involved.

Synopsis

B767 flight crew holding short for Runway 8R (HS5) is cleared for takeoff but the Captain turns left for Runway 12 while the First Officer is completing the takeoff checklist. Flight is cleared for takeoff Runway 12. Fatigue is cited as a contributing factor by the Captain.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport
State Reference : DC

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : PCT
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Ferry
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class B : DCA

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 11426
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 44
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2227
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 977672
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Other / Unknown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On departure from DCA off Runway 01, we made the initial turn to follow the Potomac River to the northwest per the noise abatement and prohibited area avoidance procedures. The cloud cover was approximately 800 FT broken, so I planned to pick up the DCA 328 radial. I knew my heading was good for avoiding the prohibited area, so I patiently waited for the radial to come in. After a minute or more, when it seemed like the radial should've come in and I still had a needle deflection to the right, I turned 5 to 10 degrees right to intercept the radial. After another minute, I turned another 5 degrees right, but started suspecting that something was not set up quite right. There was a slight crosswind factor from the right, but it did not seem like it was significant enough to require this amount (15 degrees) of intercept angle. Approximately 5 minutes into the flight, Potomac Departure asked us if we were still following the 328 degree radial. The First Officer responded in the affirmative. While I was not picking up the radial (I mistakenly had a localizer frequency set in NAV #1), the First Officer had set up the DCA 328 radial on the Fix page of the FMS. We believed we were close to the centerline. I had the scale on my PFD too far out for the picture to be accurate. The Controller said we looked to be about 3 miles north of centerline and assigned a heading of 300 degrees to intercept. I finally got the correct frequency entered in NAV 1 and returned to the assigned course.

Several factors led to this deviation from course. 1) Insufficient crew brief: I completely failed to cover the course I would fly after takeoff. I did not brief the noise abatement procedure for DCA. I did not include the information that I would fly the green needle with the DCA 328 radial set in. Had I briefed this properly, the frequency and radial would have been set up properly before we even left the gate. Instead, it occurred to me as we were taking the runway for takeoff that I would need to be in green needles with the DCA 328 radial set in. I briefed this while taking the runway; clearly not the right time to do that. I said that I believed the frequency to be 111.0 and the First Officer responded "109.9," which I set in and didn't question. I do not fault the First Officer for the incorrect frequency. The bigger error was not the frequency, but the timing. We were all of a sudden under time pressure of our own making as we were taking the runway for takeoff. 2) Complacency: A) I've flown this departure numerous times and felt that it was no big deal. B) Flight was a reposition flight and the last flight of the day. This may have led me to treat it differently from a revenue flight. 3) Fatigue: While I felt fine and alert when crew scheduling assigned us this schedule change, I started to recognize in flight that I was perhaps not as alert as I should have been. It was our fourth leg, starting in our 12th hour of duty, on a day that followed a reduced rest overnight. Be mindful of complacency; treat every flight the same; [follow] SOP

always. An improper brief and setup led to this deviation. Upon realizing that the navigation was not properly set while taking the runway for takeoff, we could have taxied off the runway to setup properly.

Synopsis

A CRJ-900 Captain reported deviating from the charted course on departure from DCA, citing failure to brief and properly set up navigation systems as contributory factors. Fatigue was also a factor.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MDW.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1700

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility : Icing
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : MDW
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class C : MDW

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 977514
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Workload

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Doing the ILS 31C circle to land 22L at Midway, descending through light to moderate icing; maneuvering around weather (cells); as always, Chicago kept us high for as long as possible. I [loaded] the approach in the FMS, autopilot on. We were high and fast, I dropped gear and put out flaps and speed brake, and the autopilot blew right through the Marker Altitude (HOBEL at 1,700). I clicked off autopilot and leveled, lost 300 FT. Tower told us they had a low altitude alert. Came back to 1,700, then flew the pattern for 22L, made wide turn but was stable and able to make the runway. Don't over rely on automation; stay ahead of airplane and intervene when needed; CDOs (Continuous Duty Overnights) should have a minimum of nine hours between flights (this stand up has an average time in hotel room of four hours); monitor self and be sure of total sleep each day.

Synopsis

A B737-700 Captain reported getting a low altitude alert from MDW Tower following an unstable approach. Reporter mentioned fatigue as a factor.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 16000

Environment

Light : Dusk

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Direct
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Improperly Operated

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6400
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 400
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 977153
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Declared Emergency
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Level at 16,000 FT en route, we received a master warning "CABIN PRESS" light. I checked cabin pressure it was at 10,000 FT. I called for memory items for emergency descent. We then did the QRC for an emergency descent. I notified ATC that we had pressurization problem and were immediately cleared to descend. At 10,000 FT we finished the checklist and then did QRH for "CABIN PRESS." We completed the checklist, which resolved the situation and continued to destination without further incident.

This event occurred because we missed verifying the bleeds were on during both the "Before Takeoff" and "Climb Checklists." During both checklists the packs were set correctly, but the bleeds were left in the off position. I feel that fatigue played a role in this incident as well as the dark conditions in the cockpit. This was our fourth night of CDOs (continuous duty overnights) and while I did sleep during the previous day and during the hotel stay I think that after four days of a choppy/disruptive sleep pattern, fatigue is inevitable. Prior to the flight I felt ok, certainly not what I would consider fatigued. When we got off the plane at our destination though I did feel tired; perhaps having to cope with the abnormal situation added to the feeling of fatigue. The dark conditions in the cockpit also contributed because of the difficulty in verifying the bleed switch position visually in the dark cockpit.

I will certainly be more vigilant in the future regarding my observations during the before takeoff checklist, although this checklist is sometimes run during taxi, and during the climb checklist. I will also physically touch the bleed switches during my climb flow and make sure to visually verify the switch position and again when reading the checklist. I also feel that four CDOs in a row are too many. I feel two are acceptable and three should be the max. I will be avoiding CDOs in the future.

Synopsis

Following four Continuous Duty Overnights (CDOs), a DHC-8 flight crew performed an emergency descent due to the failure of the cabin to pressurize. Once stable at a safe altitude they discovered the engine bleeds had never been opened despite the requirement that they be checked open during the performance of both the Before Takeoff and Climb checklists. The reporter stressed his belief that

accumulated fatigue from the ragged rest schedule was a major contributor to the oversight.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : N90.TRACON
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : N90
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 3
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Descent

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976953
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

At the end of our nine hour flight we were given a descent to 12,000 FT. We were then given a clearance direct ROBER. The next clearance we were given was abeam ROBER to slow to 250 KTS and I thought I was cleared to 9,000 as on the STAR. Since we were cleared direct ROBER, I was confused with the clearance. The Controller was giving a clearance to someone else so I couldn't confirm the confusion instantly. I attempted to clarify the clearance and a supervisor came on and clarified direct to ROBER abeam (a previous fix) slow to 250 KTS. At this point the Captain questioned the descent to 9,000 and started to slow the descent as we approached 12,000. I read back our full clearance including the descent to 9,000 and the Controller clarified to stop descent at 12,000 and that we'd get lower from Approach. The Controller didn't seem to have an issue with our descent through 12,000 to 11,600. We climbed back to 12,000 with no other issues.

Synopsis

A tired B767-300ER flight crew suffered a momentary altitude excursion before they could get a clarification to a confusing clearance.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : TUS.TRACON
State Reference : AZ

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : TUS
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use.Localizer/Glideslope/ILS : Runway 11L
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class E : TUS

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976585
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Terrain Warning
When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Received vector for ILS 11L approach to TUS from the ZONNA1 arrival, descending from 11,000 on heading 260, was cleared to 6,000 while in downwind north of airport. As we were given a turn to base of 230 degrees approach asked if we had RJ traffic in sight at our 10 o'clock on approach to runway, picked up traffic in the turn and was cleared to follow traffic cleared for the visual Runway 11L. We had briefed the LOC 11L IAP (NOTAMs indicated glideslope out of service) with visual back-up, and the terrain considerations around the airport including the Eng Out alt MA procedure prior to the descent. As we acquired the traffic I turned toward CALLS on the LOC course and asked for 4,600 to be set in the alt MCP window descending to intercept the LOC, armed the LOC on the MCP and was heading to intercept. We lost visual with the traffic and while looking and descending, I did not notice the LOC did not capture, once this was identified while still descending to 4,600, we received a CAUTION TERRAIN alert. I quickly turned back to intercept, but immediately started getting advisories from Approach Control about terrain and simultaneously received a TERRAIN, TERRAIN PULL UP PULL UP (closure rate) warning.

I executed the escape and climbed, we heard the warning twice as we climbed away from the threat. Once clear and turning back toward the LOC course, with the runway back in sight we quickly verified our position, configured to continue the approach visually and landed. However in getting back to a reasonable descent path to land I was about 10-15 KTS above Vref at touchdown with displaced threshold - all else was uneventful. Throughout the GPWS event my First Officer (pilot not flying) executed her duties exceptionally well providing me callouts, and suggestions both while flying the escape maneuver, and then to get back into a position where we could still safely re-establish the approach and landing. I would say our training kicked in with the terrain alerts and despite the tasking workload her crew coordination was commendable. We had both commuted into base earlier in the day prior to the late departure for this first leg and I believe some fatigue was a contributor to the late LOC Not captured identification.

Synopsis

An MD80 Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on approach to TUS. Failure to recognize LOC did not capture and fatigue played a part.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : A80.TRACON
State Reference : GA

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : A80
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use.STAR : CANUK ONE
Airspace.Class B : ATL

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976284
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

When we checked in with Atlanta Approach, we were assigned 26R. That caused a bit of a rush in approach set up and briefing, as we were expecting 27L because we were on CANUK 1 arrival. I loaded the 26R approach in the FMS. I ran through the legs page to review the changes; I got confused because the downwind in the legs page was still for the south side. To troubleshoot, I reselected the arrival. I did realize that this would load the arrival from the beginning, so I changed the first fix to the fix we were going to at the time; CANUK. Despite the attempt to fix the downwind problem, it still did not change to the north runway downwind. Then the Captain pointed out that the downwind did not change, because we did not need to fly the downwind as we were going to land west. I was happy with the situation at this point and ready to execute the change. I executed, with the Captain's concurrence. While I was confused about the downwind fixes on the legs page, we were already on top of CANUK. The aircraft started a turn to the left to go back to CANUK, which was already behind us when I executed the change. I realized that something was not right. I said "where is this thing going". The Captain then took the controls, disconnected the autopilot, and manually flew the aircraft back on course. We were less than a mile from CANUK, when we realized what was happening and took the corrective action. We were never more than half a dot off course during the whole event. No separation to my knowledge occurred.

On the outbound flight, we had a FLAP FAIL caution message after the pushback. We had to return to the gate to let the maintenance troubleshoot. The troubleshooting process caused approximately an hour and a half of delay. By the time we got to the layover, we had five hours and sixteen minutes on the ground. With the van ride there taking twenty minutes each way, I effectively slept 3 1/2 hours that day. The whole flight to ATL, I was feeling the effects of sleep deprivation. So when I was confused by the downwind legs, my positional awareness got lost faster than usual. If I had more sleep, I probably would have realized that I didn't need the downwind legs. Also, I didn't check the first waypoint one last time before executing. Even though both the Captain and I checked the waypoints before executing, we flew over CANUK during the time spent confused about the downwind.

Synopsis

A CRJ200 First Officer experienced confusion while attempting to reprogram the FMC to reflect a runway change. The downwind leg of the arrival remains on the south side of the airport which does not appear correct to the reporter and delays execution of the changes, resulting in a minor track deviation. Fatigue was cited as a factor in the incident.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dusk
Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked

Component

Aircraft Component : Oil Distribution
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976210
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 13795
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 115
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2655
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976210
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Maintenance

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : General Seating Area
Cabin Activity : Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976464
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Maintenance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : Work Refused

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

Report to duty mid afternoon. Engine oil leak, boarding delayed, delayed flight for mechanic's engine run up. I visually observed engine with cowling removed after

engine idle run up. In spite of test being inconclusive in my opinion, the aircraft was returned to service. After conferring with several mechanics who also observed the idle run up, the aircraft was refused until a high power check could be performed to more accurately verify the condition of the unknown source oil leak. I, again visually observed the engine after high power check was made. "Cowl full of oil after high power." Next aircraft available for our flight still enroute. Proposed departure time sometime before midnight. That would put us into our destination near sun up, 6 1/2 hours late and just under one hour short of our allowed max duty time. Having gotten up at early that morning, I was not physically prepared to fly an all-nighter. Neither was the First Officer. And, after having to be so personally involved in the maintenance issue and subsequent aircraft refusal in order to avoid taking an engine with a "cracked de-oiler housing" over water, I was now unable to nap before the flight and complete my trip safely. I called in "fatigued." So, you can either fly this broken, leaking aircraft, or you can prop yourself up to 4 in the morning, or you can call in fatigued and lose a month's mortgage payment. I don't believe that this is how a system based on "Safety First" is really supposed to work. The new aircraft was re-crewed with short call reserves and left before midnight.

Narrative: 2

The maintenance issues started when the plane arrived with a large oil leak on the left engine. An idle run showed no leaks, and Maintenance wanted to defer it. The Captain refused the aircraft unless a high power run showed no leaks as well. The high power run revealed the leaks and the airplane was taken out of service. They turned out to be a cracked De-oiler housing, a faulty gear box oil fill plug, and a leaking oil quantity transmitter. Kudos to the Captain for preventing a possible in flight shutdown and ETOPS diversion on an airplane that our Maintenance Organization thought was safe to operate over the largest body of water on the planet with no diversion airports. For that, we were rewarded with the loss of 10 plus hours of pay. Something is wrong with this system.

Narrative: 3

I am a Flight Attendant and during the middle of my working an out and back all night trip I reported myself 'fatigued' and did not complete my return trip back to my domicile. The night before I was converted from "Call-in" reserve to "Ready" in the early evening. I woke up early that morning and received phone call that from crew desk early that evening for a late night "Standby." I tried to take a nap (perhaps 20 minutes) to prepare myself for a possible trip and drive to the airport. When I arrived at the airport and called the crew desk at a couple of hours before midnight and I was given the assignment. The flight time was scheduled at 9 hours 56 minutes, the duty time was 12 hours and 20 minutes and the ground time was scheduled 45 minutes for a quick turn-around. I went to gate and worked the first leg taking the #4 position on a 757. The flight crew including me were at the minimum of 4. It was an almost full flight. After the inflight beverage and food service I talked to all crew members plus the cockpit about my concerns for safety. I noticed that I was questioning my reactions. Upon landing I asked my flying partner to go extra slow and deliberately to disarm the doors so we would not accidentally deploy the slide. When the door opened and the passengers departed I then knew I could not safely fly anymore because I was not as alert as I should be. I then called the crew desk, talked to the departing pilots, the arriving pilots for the next leg and to operations. I told them I didn't feel comfortable with the amount of hours I was awake. I was tired and I would have been up 28 hours by the time I

landed in ZZZ - longer for my drive home. I was concerned that I would not be able to operate the safety medical and security equipment swiftly and correctly on the return flight. While I have heard painful stories from other flight attendants about how difficult it is to stay up for this trip is if you are on "Ready Reserve" without a rest period this was the first time I experienced how exhausting and unreasonable this trip is. How can I prepare for this type of trip a 12 hour plus night without rest on "ready reserve" after I have been up all day and not be fatigued?

Synopsis

A B757 flight crew refused an aircraft because of an oil leak and when the subsequent departure delay created a very long duty day they called in fatigued and were replaced.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 500

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 3
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use.Localizer/Glideslope/ILS : Runway 32R
Flight Phase : Final Approach

Component

Aircraft Component : Altimeter
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Improperly Operated

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 19000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 5000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976206
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Fatigue

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 18500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 5500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976404
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 8222
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 976405
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Terrain Warning
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

On approach to 32R at approximately 700 FT on glidepath, we received a GPWS "TOO LOW TERRAIN" and went around. After leveling off at 1,600 meters, the Approach Controller asked us to confirm our altitude. We read back 1,600 meters and after a quick discussion between us, I asked ATC to confirm QNH to which he responded 10.22 Hectopascals. We then realized that the altimeter setting we had set, 10.03 was QFE and that even though we had seen 10.22 on the hourly weather off the ACARS and discussed why the initial Approach Controller was telling us 10.03, we never picked up on the fact that we were being given QFE not QNH and were about 400 FT high. We promptly reset the altimeters and came around for an uneventful approach and landing. After a long flight and being on the back side of the clock, pilot fatigue was definitely a factor along with being unfamiliar with Russia flying.

Narrative: 2

[Information Identical to Narrative 1]

Narrative: 3

[Information Identical to Narrative 1]

Synopsis

A B767 executed a go-around after receiving a GPWS "TOO LOW TERRAIN" alert because a foreign ATC Controller issued a QFE altimeter lower than the ATIS QNH setting which was actually correct.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 10
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 26000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : FCC (Flight Control Computer)
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 163
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 974547
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Fatigue
Analyst Callback : Attempted

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 213
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 5649
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 974543

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were cleared to cross an arrival intersection at FL240. The aircraft was descending via VNAV/LNAV. Approaching that intersection the Controller changed the clearance to cross it at or below FL240 and descend to FL200. I changed the intersection altitude on the LEGS page to 240B and the Cruise page to FL200. The First Officer verified and I initiated. I got distracted with other functions and did not notice that the VNAV light went out and the aircraft reverted to speed function and shallowed the descent to 1,000 FPM. By the time we caught it and the Controller alerted us, it was too late. The First Officer and I tried to figure out why it would go out of VNAV but [could not]. When you are fresh and alert, the new automation can work great. But when you are tired and worn out after a long day, automation can be your worst enemy! Put the clearance that you will receive on the chart so that it is programmed in the computer. Any time a pilot has to alter the computer descent altitudes, you are asking for trouble.

Narrative: 2

[Narrative #2 had no additional information]

Synopsis

After an arrival fix crossing altitude was changed to "at or below FL240", both pilots verified the B737-700 MCP and FMC entries but somehow the FMC transitioned to Vertical Speed without the pilots seeing, and the crossing restriction was missed.

Time / Day

Date : 201110
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Ferry
Flight Phase : Parked

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 140
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3200
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 974204
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : Work Refused

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were to fly a plane down to be painted and take home one that was done. I already had two nights of very poor sleep with one in ZZZZ and the other at home

not being able to get to sleep. Once I finally got to sleep at home, the Crew Desk called around XA30 to tell me of the trip for this evening. I never got back to sleep and was unable to nap during the day. Had this trip gone as planned, I felt I could have safely completed it. However, nothing was done in preparation for this flight. The plane sat on the ground for five hours with numerous open write ups and it had not been fueled. Nothing was done to the aircraft until we finally got to it at the hangar and started the ball rolling ourselves. Delays rolled on and on. The more we were delayed the more fatigued I got, until finally I determined I was no longer able to safely complete the mission. I called in fatigued.

Synopsis

A320 Captain reports calling in fatigued when poor preflight rest and maintenance delays combine to produce unacceptable fatigue.